Gregory of Nyssa's short treatise Concerning Infants Who Have Died Prematurely (1)
examines a dilemma that has plagued every society from ancient times until now, namely, the
death of newly born infants who have not had the opportunity to enjoy the light of life. The text
is freighted with rhetorical devices, not to mention Gregory's usual self-deprecating attitude, for
example, when he praises Hierios, a learned prefect of Cappadocia (2). In the opening paragraph
Gregory compares Hierios, the "crown of my head" (J.71.22), to himself as "an old horse past its
prime for racing" (J.67.15).
A quick glance at the title may give the impression that Gregory is concerned with the
sacrament of baptism as an introduction into the fullness of Christian life, but this sacramental
character does not enter the picture at all (3). Instead, the bishop of Nyssa composes a rather
philosophical treatise to Hierios in response to the latter's inquiry about a person's future
happiness which depends upon his or her behavior in this present life. True to his rhetorical style,
Gregory asks the following question:
Does that soul [an infant's] see the Judge, stand with others before the tribunal and submit to the
same judgment as those who have lived? Is it deemed worthy or is purged with fire according to
the Gospel, or is it refreshed by the dew of a blessing? (J.73.13-17)
Shortly afterwards Gregory readily admits that he "is unable to comprehend the state of
such a soul because a reward and retribution apply to a state [God] had already anticipated,
whereas they do not apply to a person who had not yet lived" (J.74.1-4). Here the subject matter
of De Infants is clearly outlined in terms of a reward or retribution (antidosis). Common sense
implies that an infant does not fall under this category. However, the question of premature death
is used as a point of reference for a broader consideration of reward and punishment according to
the merits of each individual person. The bishop of Nyssa illumines the theme of merit by alluding
to Matthew 5.3 where Jesus Christ in the guise of a king delegates his affairs to his servants:
"Since you have done this, you who are just will receive the kingdom." This Gospel passage
should be viewed in the larger context of each person's responsibility to rid him or herself of evil
which results from pleasure, "for we achieve virtue and alienation from pleasure with much effort"
(J.75.10-11).
According to Gregory, humankind is divided into three classes: those who have lived
virtuously and have merited a reward, those who have not followed virtue's path and deserve
punishment, and infants who, by reason of their early deaths, do not fall under the first two
categories. Because the theme of Infants does not apply to baptism but to merit, it thereby points
to the larger issue of happiness and our capacity for making free choices which is essential for
attaining such a goal. This point is illustrated by an example of two men suffering from diseased
eyes, a symbol of two states of soul:
One person desiring to cure himself should apply a medicinal remedy provided that he has the
patience. Another person with less discipline should employ baths and be subject to medical
attention for restoring health to his eyes. We therefore believe that both persons have the
consequence of their respective choices: the one deprived of light and the other person, its
enjoyment. (J.82.11-13)
Here one man makes use of remedies available to him whereas the other does not. In each
situation, the result or reward (antidosis) follows from employing the correct remedy to cure this
infirmity. But in the case of infants, they have not yet attained the capacity to choose between
good and evil, even though the illness of ignorance afflicts every person:
But for the soul which has not yet tasted virtue and is in an evil state, inasmuch as evil has not
been present from the beginning, does not share in virtue because the superior life which a person
had from the beginning gives rise to knowledge of God and participation in him. Such a person
nourishes his soul by the food of contemplation, and he develops it as much as possible. (J.84.21-85.6)
This "superior life which a person had from the beginning" and which "gives rise to
knowledge of God (gnosis) and participation (metousia) in him" is a fundamental theme pervading
all the works of Gregory of Nyssa. Those who have progressed in virtue will enjoy the fruits of
virtue according to their practice of it. On the other hand, infants who have never "tasted" virtue
will nevertheless see God according to their limited capacity. Thus the righteous and infant will
both participate in the beatific vision despite their different conditions. It should be noted that
both individuals are not afflicted by evil. The reason for their participation in God rests upon the
fact that every person is made in his divine image and likeness, a biblical theme based upon
Genesis 1.27, which is a favorite theme of Gregory of Nyssa: "And God made man in his image;
in the image of God he created him."
Infants has two references to this key passage, J.77.22-23 and J.79.23-24. The first
excerpt forms the basis for "a two-fold division which belongs to every creature and as the
Apostle says [Col 1.16], is visible and invisible (J.78.3)." Gregory continues in the next sentence
by saying that the invisible "signifies what is intelligible" whereas "the visible belongs to the sense
and the body." Earlier in the same paragraph the bishop of Nyssa situates his reflections within a
certain "logical order" (J.76.20) or taxis (4). David Balas has commented upon this passage by
observing that such a taxis allows participation in God, including the souls of infants, "which have
not been prepared by the practice of virtue [who] will gradually become capable of more" (cf.
J.84.19-20: `They [who practice virtue] partake of divine nourishment to a greater or less extend
according to their capacity') (5).
It is interesting to note that in another work of Gregory (6) the word taxis, together with
akolouthia, signifies both the beginning, development and end of our sanctification with special
mention of First Corinthians 15.20: "But as it is, Christ has risen from the dead, the first fruits of
those who have fallen asleep." In other words, the presence of Christ is a sort of "dough" which
leavens the entire loaf of bread, a symbol of humanity in its entirety. This sanctification follows a
definite taxis which must be in accord with that "logical order" mentioned above where the end
resembles the beginning but only in a newly transformed manner (7). Thus both the infant who had
died prematurely and the person who had lived virtuously will participate in that same growth in
Christ.
Such growth in the love and knowledge of Jesus Christ assumes a definite form, and
Gregory employs a special word to signify it, epektasis (8). This term implies stretching forth to
attain a future spiritual goal and follows a definite taxis and akolouthia as already mentioned.
Although the notion of epektasis does not occur in the following citation from Gregory's
Commentary on the Song of Songs, its context is nevertheless delineated. Note the paradox of
such epektasis or progress: it takes place within the context of a reality which already exists,
namely, the perfection of human nature and its fulfillment:
Because creation exists from its very beginning by the divine power, the end of each created being
is linked with its beginning: everything created from nothing comes into existence with its
beginning. Human nature is also created but does not, like other created beings, advance towards
its perfection, but right from the beginning it is created perfect: "Let us make man according to
the image and likeness of God" (Gen 1.26). Here is the very summit and perfection of goodness.
What can be more exalted than similarity to God? Thus the end of the first creation is
simultaneous with its beginning, for human nature originated in perfection. (J.457-8)
Within the framework of Infants, the perfection of human nature "right from the
beginning" supports Gregory's assumption that children who have died prematurely share the
same capacity of growth or epektasis in perfection as adults who have lived virtuously. However,
the former do not have to undergo that process of realizing perfection which occurs on the plane
of temporal existence. They have been cut off from such development almost as soon as they
were born. The bishop of Nyssa uses a word difficult to translate into English, diastema, which
represents this spacial-temporal domain. Gregory employs this term to signify awareness of our
separation from God. As T. Paul Verghese points out, diastema has two aspects: "One that it is
always extended in space and time, from somewhere to somewhere and from a point in time to
another point in time, but also secondly that such created existence is never self-contained or self-generated, but totally dependent on a reality which transcends space and time" (9). Verghese refers
to a passage from Gregory's Commentary on Ecclesiastes which points to the "one-way" gap
between Creator and Creation:
Thus all creation cannot transgress its natural limitations by a comprehensive insight; rather, it
always remains within its own bounds and whatever it may view, it sees itself. And should
creation think it beholds anything beyond itself, this cannot be, for it lacks the capacity to look
beyond its own nature. All our notions are bound by time; they attempt to transcend their proper
limits but cannot. Intervals of time constitute all our thoughts as well as the substance of a person
who gives rise to such thoughts.
Our mind functions by using intervals within time, so how can it grasp [God's] nature which is not
subject to temporal extension? Through the medium of time, the inquisitive mind always leaves
behind any thought older than what it just discovered. The mind also busily searches through all
kinds of knowledge yet never discovers the means to grasp eternity in order to transcend both
itself and what we earlier considered, namely, the eternal existence of beings. This effort
resembles a person standing on a precipice (A smooth, precipitous rock which abruptly falls down
into a boundless distance suggests this transcendence. Its prominence reaches on high while also
falling to the gaping deep below). A person's foot can therefore touch that ridge falling off to the
depths below and find neither step nor support for his hand. This example may pertain to the
soul's passage through intervals of time in its search for [God's] nature which exists before
eternity and is not subject to time. (J.412-14)
"The soul's passage through intervals of time in its search for [God's] nature" invites
greater sensitivity to the communication of God's presence. However, the gap between creation
and Creator is primarily ontological since we cannot objectify God. Awareness of this interval is
difficult to conceive (10). The bishop of Nyssa acknowledges this in Infants yet is aware that the
spacial-temporal diastema is a place requiring a certain nourishment. He comments upon First
Corinthians 3.2, the source for his exegesis as follows:
Just as at the first stage of life an infant is nourished at the breast by milk, so does a person
consume food when he becomes an adult. Thus I believe that the different stages of growth share
a certain order and sequence [taxis kai akolouthia] according to one's capacity as he advances to
the stage where people enjoy a life of blessedness. We have learned this from Paul who in one
way nourishes persons who have grown through virtue and in another way an infant who has not
yet grown up: "I have fed you with milk, not solid food since you were not yet ready for it [1Cor
3.2]." (J.83.6-17)
Gregory of Nyssa wishes to examine the subject of infant mortality "by considering its
logical order" (akolouthia). As Jean Danielou has remarked concerning this passage, Gregory's
use of akolouthia "consistera a partir d'abord une verite generale et certaine, puis a en deduire les
consequences concernant le point particulier qui est en question" (11). This akolouthia is proposed
to Hierios with regard to the death of infants which was a dilemma confronted by ancient thinkers
(12). Gregory does not confine himself to mythological ideas but continues the philosophical
reflection begun by Plato who "left unexplained much of what philosophers had discussed about
coming back to life" (J.70.7-8).
In another treatise closely related to the theme of Infants Gregory of Nyssa speaks of a
"new birth" which is a consequence of Christ's resurrection:
We can offer a different understanding of procreation, a promise made by God, which is worthy
of his blessings because this capacity is altered to serve that [new] birth. The great Isaiah
anticipated this when he said, "We have conceived, O Lord, because of your fear and have been in
pain and have brought forth in the earth the breath of your salvation" (Is 26.18). If this birth is
good and procreation is the cause of salvation as the Apostle [Paul] says (1Tm 2.15), the Spirit
which brings forth salvation never deserts the person who has begotten through this birth a
multitude of blessings. Concerning Those Who Have Died, J.63.
This passage sheds light on another one from Infants which intimates that newborn
children who have died prematurely are not tinged by the effects of original sin:
However, the person who cleanses himself by an appropriate cure and removes the sore of
ignorance from his clear-sighted soul is sincere and obtains a reward (antidosis) in this natural life.
But the person who shuns purity of virtue and fosters an incurable illness of ignorance through
deceptive pleasures becomes estranged from his true nature and does not share in life. On the
other hand, a simple infant who is not ill with regard to the soul's eyes participates in the light; he
does not require cleansing because his soul has not been unwell from birth. (J.82.21-83.4)
But as Danielou has pointed out, this is a philosophical question (13), not especially a
theological one. He remarks that all persons are created by God to participate in the beatific
vision. However, personal sin goes contrary to this design as symbolized by that man mentioned
above who does take proper care to remedy his diseased eyes. While the question of a reward
(antidosis) is certainly important, Gregory prefers to concentrate more upon a person's capacity to
possess God which sets him or her on the path of perpetual growth or epektasis.
As Marguerite Harl has observed (14), Infants has "trois zones concentriques" with their
proper metaphors. The first "zone" discusses justice which is not specifically Christian, the
second pertains to the Stoic doctrine of universal providence which has been Christianized (15), and
the third "zone" which employs philosophic terminology for discussing the nature of created
beings. Harl says that this "zone centrale" pertains to nourishment which pertains to that spiritual
sustenance derived from the contemplation of God. It is here that Gregory makes a transition
from philosophical speculation to Christian reflection of the soul's relationship to divine life.
The participation in God which Gregory describes in terms of knowledge of God (16) does
not belong to the realm of being or ousia but, as David Balas has pointed out (17), takes place
according to that order and sequence (taxis kai akolouthia). Here the category of relationship
applies which enables both infants and adults (who have practiced virtue) to become capable of
greater participation:
Just as at the first stage of life an infant is nourished at the breast by milk, so does a person
consume food when he becomes an adult. (J.83.6-8)
We may contrast these two types of nourishment with Gregory's example of a banquet
which plays a central role in the second half of Infants. Here a steward is present who knows
exactly what to offer each guest and to regulate the behavior of those at the banquet in case
anyone gets out of hand. Paul J. Alexander has noted with regard to details related to the food of
this simile, "In addition, so he [Gregory] seems to argue, there are present in creation a number of
elements necessary for the physical and moral functioning of human existence but capable of being
misused by the individual. It is God's foreknowledge of the concurrence of the human penchant
to evil with the existing opportunity for wrongdoing by the perversion of essentially beneficial
elements that justifies the death of the ahori [i.e., those who have died prematurely] (18)." The
lengthy figure of a feast concerns infants who have died prematurely in that God's providence
prevents both the means and opportunity for evil which they may perform:
He [God] does not give an occasion for choosing it [evil] through his providential capacity which
knows the effect of a depraved inclination to produce bad deeds (19). (J.90.16-19)
Towards the conclusion of Infants Gregory employs the harsh words of Psalm 57, verse
11 (20), to show the attitude "virtuous persons" should have towards "those living in evil."
Although he says shortly afterwards that infants who have died "do not share that virtue which
belongs to those have been purified" and who thus lay outside the scope of this verse, it
nevertheless applies to them. The reason for this lies in the fact that such infants "are prevented
from doing harm" and share in the same virtuous state as those who have lived a life of moral
rectitude. Again, the bishop of Nyssa does not focus attention so much upon the reward or
antidosis of children who have passed away; rather, he uses this subject as a broader foundation
on which to contrast two human conditions represented by virtue and evil. The context of Ps
57.11 makes better sense when compared with a similar passage from Gregory's Commentary on
the Inscriptions of the Psalms:
When our humanity will be united with the angels and when the divine battle-order lifts it out of
the present turmoil, it will sing a victorious song of triumph at the bloody defeat of the enemy.
Then every spirit will praise God's grace forever, continually magnifying his blessedness by further
graces. This I call true blessedness. (J.69)
Here (resurrected) humanity as a whole achieves its identity of "true blessedness" when it
is "united with the angels." Such is the reward of overcoming the negative side of that diastema
or perception of distance from God. The enemy represents the evils of this present existence
which all persons must overcome by a life of virtue under God's grace. Gregory characteristically
closes his treatise, as he does in many of his other words, with words of encouragement by saying
that "consideration of the Apostle's [Paul] words offer consolation by mentioned [God] who made
everything in wisdom and who brought about good through evil." (J.97.1-3)
Jean Danielou has dated Concerning Infants Who Have Died Prematurely around the years
385-386 (21). This treatise does not offer to explain the blessed destiny of children who have died
so young before attaining maturity. Instead, Gregory of Nyssa is satisfied to state the fact
according to his Christian beliefs and reflections upon Holy Scripture. At the beginning of
Infants, Gregory speaks of "our advanced age" which is an indication that he may have written it
late in life, ten years before the generally accepted date of his death in 394. Despite this claim,
Danielou (p.182) says that such a statement may be a rhetorical device, perhaps in deference to
the younger Hierios to whom the treatise is addressed.
[M.161 & J.67] You know, my distinguished friend, that orators and writers are certainly
qualified to praise the greatness of your achievements as though they were referring to a contest
in a stadium. Any respectable person who can both speak well and develop an argument clearly
realizes how to praise your outstanding accomplishments. Since our advanced age prevents us
from participating in the contest, we will pay attention to you alone as though we excelled the
noise and leaps of [rival] horses because we are urged on by a favorable report about you. Take
the example of an old horse past its prime for racing. Often this animal stomps with desire, keeps
its head erect, breathes ardently with attentive eyes, eagerly moves its feet and vigorously strikes
its hooves in longing to compete, despite the fact that it can no longer [J.68] do so. Similarly, our
remarks cannot compete due to our age, and we leave the stadium for erudite persons like you
among whom you show promise in the prime of life.
But I do not wish to praise you further. We cannot add anything to your convincing,
detailed report because it is impossible to add further laudable words for adequately making this
comparison drawn from such paradoxical statements. Not only do protruding eyelids overshadow
and obscure the eyes' splendor and purity, but they hide the gentle sun. Thus noble, high-minded
behavior united with an abiding sense of humility does not obstruct [M.164] our vision but
enhances it. As a result, neither does our gleam weaken nor does a spirit of humility disdain what
lies hidden within us. Rather, each complements the other: one [humility] shares the honor of the
other [noble behavior] while the other enjoys its esteem. Someone else should explain this and
shield the soul's multi-faceted vision. We may compare the soul's eyes with the hairs of one's head
which are located on both sides and are fully perceptive and discerning. In this way the soul can
see both what lies far off and [J.69] nearby and not rely upon a teacher's experience for acquiring
beneficial knowledge. Furthermore, hope sustains our eyes: one eye operates through the faculty
of our memory and another thoroughly penetrates [the soul]. All these operations serve to order
our mind and keep it fully enlightened.
A person can admire the hidden wealth of poverty provided that he is of our age and
knows how to value it. If this were not the case, your example offers inspiration to imitate
poverty, and your simplicity is of greater value than all Kroesos' wealth. What benefit can the
resources of earth or sea impart since their abundance is of no value in comparison to your life?
Just as craftsmen who strip off rust from iron make it gleam with the appearance of silver, so does
the ray of your life which is always cleansed from the rust of money appear ever more radiant. I
will allow more competent persons to speak of these matters because it is more appropriate to
comment about the advantage of not being captivated by greed. Allow me to speak frankly not
because you despise profit but because no one except you can attain the good to which we had
just alluded. Instead of clothing, money or slaves, you acquire mens' souls and deposit them in
the treasury of love.
[J.70] Writers and orators have the admirable task of extolling such matters. However,
for the observations of our old age to be inspiring which step by step examine the question posed
by your foresight, we must inquire about [infants] who have died prematurely and how birth is
related to death. Among pagan philosophers, the wise Plato (22) left unexplained much of what
philosophers had discussed about coming back to life. Clearly his reflections are far superior to
theirs. If there is anything worthwhile examining here which can solve the difficulty of this
problem, you will certainly agree with it; however, should you fail to take old age into
consideration, you will graciously consent to [M.165] our position. History says that Xerxes,
who united every nation under the sun and ruled over the inhabited world, gladly accepted the
boon of poverty upon completing an expedition against the Greeks. Water was that gift which
Xerxes held not in a container but in his own hands. You too must imitate him according to the
greatness of your soul which enables you to accept a gift, even if it is a humble one like water.
[J.71] Both an educated and uneducated person can observe the beauty of heavenly
wonders by looking up at the sky, yet whoever considers them by using philosophy sees them
differently instead of relying upon sense impressions. (For example, one can delight in either the
sun's rays, have a suitable opinion about the stars' radiance or be attentive to the moon's monthly
path. On the other hand, a person with a discerning soul whose mind has been cleansed through
discipline for contemplating the heavens and whose senses have forsaken whatever provides more
irrational delight, sees its harmony and appreciates that unity in the heaven's rotation which
encompasses contradictory elements. These observations pertain to heaven's inner circles which
remain in a fixed circuit; their view from afar is manifest in stars whether they are close, distant,
receding or in eclipse while their harmony remains constant through such mutations and produces
the same effect. We can never behold the stars' hidden location, but they all lead the mind on high
through wisdom).
In similar fashion, you, the honor of my head, when considering the God's concern for the
universe, omit trivial matters which concern most people. (By this I mean wealth, the vain desire
for glory resembling the stars' radiance which both restricts and blunts persons of lesser
intelligence). Neither do you leave unexamined [J.72] anything insignificant in your
contemplation of the universe and in your careful scrutiny with regard to the inequality of human
existence. Not only do you ponder both wealth and poverty or differences according to dignity
and its various types (You realize that such categories are not self-evident but exist in the
mistaken assumption with regard to anything which not only lacks substance but seems endowed
with it. Any thoughtful person who reflects upon his own condition and sees that he is not
endowed with glory yet remains puffed up with the fantasy of its splendor, is left with nothing
despite the fact that his entire fortune lies buried in the ground.). You, however, take care to
apprehend other aspects of God's providence. Anyone carefully considering this will prolong
[M.168] his life to a blessed old age, while another person will enjoy having the breath of life and
will live well up to the day of his death.
Since everything depends upon God's grace and providential will for existence, we have
another reason for understanding his solicitude on our behalf. Anything rash and unreasonable is
not from God, for according to Scripture, "In his wisdom, God has made all things" [Ps 103.24].
What is the significance of this wisdom? It brought [J.73] man into existence through birth where
he draws breath and sighs with lamentation over life's afflictions before he can enjoy its pleasures.
At birth man's senses were sluggish, and his limbs were not fully formed; he was tender,
vulnerable and lacked coordination. We may sum up these observations by saying that before
coming to birth (if reason is man's natural gift, he is not yet capable of it), man had nothing more
in his mother's womb except the capacity for drawing in air or was in the same state when he
disintegrated, has been exposed, suffocated, or spontaneously ceased living due to some infirmity.
What need is there to consider this matter? How does it relate to those who have passed away?
Does that soul see the Judge, stand with others before the tribunal and submit to the same
judgment as those who have lived? Is it deemed worthy or is purged in fire according to the
Gospel [Lk 16.24], or is it refreshed by the dew of a blessing?
[J.74] But I am unable to comprehend the state of such a soul because a reward and
retribution apply to a state [God] had already anticipated, whereas they do not apply to a person
who had not yet lived. When a favor is absent, there is no reason [M.169] to expect
compensation, and where a reward is lacking, there is no reason for good or evil because both
instances entail a recompense. When either good or evil is absent, recompensation is also absent
because the lack of harmony between these contradictory elements is self-evident; I am referring
to good and evil since both are absent when we lack an example. If there is nothing of this sort,
we cannot add anything further. Should a person possess the good, God gives it and does not
make recompense. What, then, can we say about free choice? How does it illustrate justice, and
how does it agree with the Gospel? For example, a king dispenses his affairs to those worthy of
them: "Since you have done this, you who are just will receive the kingdom" [Mt 5.3 & 10].
Since neither actions nor free choice play no role, what reason is there to hope in God? If anyone
left this matter unexamined [J.75] which pertains to the good in this passing life, he shows that it
is better not to participate in life even though one who is alive has foreigners for parents and is not
conceived in a legitimate marriage. But the person legitimately born is defiled with evil to a
greater or less extent, or even if he is completely devoid of evil, it is the result of much exertion;
we achieve virtue and alienation from pleasure only with much effort. This is what happens to a
person involved in a distressing situation who indeed shares in temporal existence or who has
struggled for virtue or who has been afflicted by evil in life by the reward of sufferings. Nothing
of the sort pertains to those who have been born prematurely; their death is considered beneficial
if what we believe comes to pass. Therefore if a lack of unreason is deemed better, there is no
reason for virtue. If no penalty pertains to the good and virtue, it would be useless and of no
value to be distressed over this when [an infant's] lack of reason is taken into consideration at
God's judgement.
You invite me to scrutinize these matters in order to obtain a firm opinion. When
pondering such a difficult matter [J.76], we should resolve it by considering the Apostle's [Paul]
words [M.172] when he reflected upon that which is unexplainable and said, "Oh, the depth of the
riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are his judgments and
how unsearchable his ways! Who can know the mind of God" [Rom 11.33]? Again the Apostle
says that the spiritual man examines all things [1Cor 2.16] and receives the wealth of God's grace
"in all utterance and in all knowledge" [1Cor 1.5]. I will not fail to investigate nor overlook by
these words anything which is unsearchable and invisible. In this way I will not make a parallel
between this argument which does not apply to the pursuit of truth with regard to a newly born
infant before he comes into the light and matures as in the case of a person who perishes through
neglect.
I do not speak rhetorically and with knowledge and am confronted with resistance yet
wish to carefully reflect upon this issue by considering its logical order. What exactly is this
order? It consists in knowing the origins of human nature and [God's] grace which brings us into
existence. If we remain constant, we will not err from our proposed interpretation. Since
everything comes from God, what is seen [J.77] in creation would be futile and no one, I believe,
would assail our response when considering the truth of the matter. It is agreed that the universe
has one cause and is not responsible for bringing itself into existence. But the universe as a whole
is always uncreated, eternal, self-contained, transcends every concept of measurement, remains
constant, is infinite and transcends all bounds. Its nature, time, space and everything in it lies
beyond our grasp even if we could grasp anything which existed before it. Divinely inspired
teaching also includes human nature. God brings everything into existence; man's created nature
is composed of various elements; it is also carefully composed from what is both divine and
intelligible. God intended this to be so for man when he endowed him with a living likeness of
himself. In this instance I think it is better to quote Scripture: "And God made man in his image;
in the image of God he created him" [Gen 1.27]. The source of this living [J.78] creation which
existed before us has a two-fold division which belongs to every creature and, as the Apostle says
[Col 1.16], is visible and invisible [M.173] (The invisible signifies what is intelligible and
incorporeal while the visible belongs to the senses and the body).
Therefore the two-fold nature of every creature (I mean the sensible and rational)
including the angelic, incorporeal nature which is invisible, belongs to the transcendent, celestial
realm where it dwells in harmony (Since our intellectual nature is subtle, pure, light, easily moved,
the heavenly body is subtle, weightless and always in motion). On the other hand, what belongs
to the earth lies is completely opposite, the senses, and does not conform to what the mind
comprehends (For how can what which lacks mass and is light have compatibility with what is
heavy and dense?). Certainly the earth has nothing in common with what is intellectual and
incorporeal. Thus [divine] foresight has in mind something better for human existence by reason
of the soul's intellectual and divine union with earthly life, and the soul has an connaturality with
fleshly existence due to its affinity with what is heavy and corporeal. The goal of these created
qualities is to glorify [God's] transcendent power through our intellectual nature as well as our
heavenly and earthy qualities (By this I mean the person who turns his regard [J.79] to God), and
to achieve unity with a single purpose in mind. The person who turns to God possesses nothing
else than that life which is associated with the intellectual nature.
Just as earthly food nourishes the body and we comprehend a certain corporeal form in
them, so does this apply to both beasts and rational beings. For this reason we must examine the
intellectual life which is essential to human nature. If fleshly nourishment is consumed which
stores life's power when ingested, how much greater is the participation of a person who never
changes and always maintains this benefit! The natural eye's reward is to grasp whatever is
connatural to it; neither a finger nor any other bodily member can see because their roles differ.
Therefore if the life belonging to intellectual nature befits participation in God, this life is not a
result of contradictory elements unless in some way it is natural to the person [M.176] who
desires it. Scripture says that man is made according to God's image [Gen 1.27], so that like sees
like. The soul's [J.80] life consists in seeing God as we have said earlier. Since ignorance of the
true good represents an overshadowing of the soul's vision which becomes so dense that the rays
of truth do not penetrate the depth of ignorance, the privation of light imparts no life. It is said
that the soul's true life is participation in the good; ignorance thwarts contemplation of God and
does not allow the soul to participate in God.
No one can say that ignorance is necessary by referring to its origin and end; rather, we
should understand the implication of such ignorance because it reveals information about the soul
along with its own knowledge. Nothing we comprehend and say can express anything about it
because opinions vary. If knowledge does not exist but is an activity of the mind, how much
further removed is ignorance about the mind since it does not exist at all! Thus we would have no
basis to inquire about the origin of what lacks existence.
Since we are speaking about life, the soul's participation in God and that knowledge which
shares in it, ignorance not only lacks substance but is the extinction of knowledge. It follows that
where participation in God does not apply, alienation from life results (an extreme case is corrupt
deeds); as a [J.81] consequence, [God] works for our benefit by extending a cure to us. Such a
remedy is indeed beneficial, and whoever is unaware of this cure fails to consider the mystery of
the Gospel. Therefore when evil alienates a person from God who is life itself, the cure of this
illness reconciles him to God who bestows life. This life which is rooted in hope belongs to
human nature; it is not inimical to us and is intended as a reward for persons who have conducted
themselves well. In fact, it is similar to that eye we have already mentioned. We do not claim that
a prize exists for an eye which has been purified and a reward for a person endowed with the
faculty of sight or a condemnation for someone blind. However, it necessarily follows that a
person endowed with the faculty of sight cannot see when passion captivates him. Similarly, a
blessed life and those who have cleansed their [M.177] souls' perceptions upon which lies a sore
of ignorance are impeded from participating in the true light. Not to have it implies that we do
not take part in life.
It is time to offer some reflections about this problem. If there is a reward for persons
who have done good and if a infant who has died has done [J.82] neither good nor evil, how can
such an infant expect any reward? We respond to those who consider the consequence of this
matter because the good proper to human nature is intelligence and is a reward in and by itself.
We can explain this by referring to two types of illnesses pertaining to vision. One person desiring
to cure himself should apply a medicinal remedy provided that he has the patience. Another
person with less discipline should employ baths and be subject to medical attention for restoring
health to his eyes. We therefore believe that both persons have the fruit of their respective
choices: the one deprived of light and the other person, its enjoyment. We apply the term reward
when it does not partake of offensive behavior. Our remarks concern infants because enjoyment
of this life belongs to human nature, but the illness of ignorance controls fleshly existence.
However, the person who cleanses himself by an appropriate cure and removes the sore of
ignorance from his clear-sighted soul is sincere and obtains a reward in this natural life. But the
person who shuns purity of virtue and fosters an incurable illness of ignorance through deceptive
pleasures becomes estranged from his true nature and does not share in life. One the other hand,
a simple infant who is not ill [J.83] with regard to the soul's eyes participates in the light; he does
not require cleansing because his soul has been healthy from birth.
This example bears a certain analogy to the life we envision. Just as at the first stage of
life an infant [M.180] is nourished at the breast by milk, so does a person consume food when he
becomes an adult. Thus I believe that the different stages of growth share a certain order and
sequence according to one's capacity as he advances to the stage where he can enjoy a life of
blessedness. We have learned this from Paul who in one way nourishes persons who have grown
through virtue and in another way an infant who has not yet grown up: "I have fed you with milk,
not solid food since you were not yet ready for it" [1Cor 3.2]. But for those persons who have
attained maturity he says, "Solid food is for the mature" [Heb 5.14], referring to those who have
trained their senses through practice.
Paul did not say that an infant and grown person are the same and that both are not ill
[J.84] (for how can both enjoy the same food when they are so different?). However, when no
illness afflicts them and they are alike, provided that they are free from passion, their enjoyment of
food differs (For happiness consists in good words, generous deeds, giving leaders their due,
allowing one's deeds to radiate by alms giving or by caring for one's wife and household. Life's
pleasures also include meetings, spectacles, hunts, baths, gymnastic schools and pleasant activities
of this sort. On the other hand, milk belongs to an infant content to remain quiet at its mother's
breast since it is incapable of anything else.). In the same way, those who nourish souls in this life
through virtue, as the Apostle says, exercise their mental faculties provided they follow a spiritual
manner of living. By reason of instilled habit and personal strength they partake of divine
nourishment to a greater or less extent according to their capacity. But for the soul which has not
yet tasted virtue and is in an evil state, inasmuch as evil has not been present from the beginning,
does not share [J.85] in virtue because the superior life which a person had from the beginning
gives rise to knowledge of God and participation in him. Such a person nourishes his soul by the
food of contemplation, and he develops it as much as possible.
We believe that the soul refrains from wickedness [M.181] by progressing in virtue, even
though it has not yet fully shared in life, for it has not progressed through all life's stages. When
speaking of the heavens, the Prophet [David] heard them declaring God's glory [Ps 18.2] and is
led to contemplate the Lord of creation. By knowing him who is truly wise as seen in the wisdom
of creation, a person is able to grasp through analogy the beauty of true light and comes to know
by the earth's solidity [God] who made it stable and immense. He turns his mind to heaven's
greatness and is led to the boundless, immeasurable power which embraces the universe. He also
sees the sun's rays shining upon us and believes in God's providential concern which has reached
us through them. If one light embraces the universe by a common luminous power and imparts
itself to everything without distinction, then how much greater is the Maker of this light! "That
he might be all in all" as the [J.86] Apostle says [1Cor 15.28] and give himself to every person
according to their capacity. Anyone may consider an ear of corn, a plant's growth, a cluster of
ripe grapes, the beauty of their ripeness either in their fruit or flower, a mountain herb
spontaneously reaching to heaven on high, fountains at the base of mountains abundantly gushing
from their hollows, rivers flowing these hollows, the sea which receives them and which stays the
same bounded by the shore without overflowing its bounds. How do these observations which
cannot be fully understood pertain to theological teachings about God? Can they delight a person
who comprehends them and lead us to virtue? I mean geometry, astronomy, comprehension of
the truth through numbers, the pursuit of what is unknown, the confirmation of what is
understood and the philosophy of divinely inspired Scripture which cleanses persons instructed in
divine mysteries.
Neither the person familiar with these matters nor the one led to comprehend transcendent
reality through the world is simple, untrained and has an undisciplined [J.87] mind. Our argument
shows that this state is not more blessed [M.184] according to the contradiction already
presented, namely, that the person who is alive is better than the one who is not. For the person
free from living in evil would not only be more blessed but would not possess it from the
beginning. The Gospel has informed us of Judas where that which does not exist is evil [Mt
26.24]. Does a punishment which uses purification always extend to the depths of innate evil
when pain does not apply to what does not exist? We therefore believe it is not right to compare
an immature infant to a virtuous person.
You inquire about an infant snatched away from life and God's providential care. But if
you ask about an illegitimate birth and an infant wrenched from its parents, perhaps you are
asking if God is the source of evil deeds, an argument which proves to be groundless. If anyone
who is carefully raised, taken care of and prayed for by his parents does not participate in life, his
sickness ends in death (which alone is the cause). We offer this [J.88] example because [divine]
providence is perfect; not only does it cure passions but provides a defence inasmuch it is offers
genuine protection right from the beginning. For [God] who knows both the future and what will
pass away thwarts an infant's development. God's foreknowledge does not hinder the evil about
to be performed and takes into consideration our free will which can do evil in the future. This
example is easy to illustrate. Consider a guest at a lavish banquet who is fully aware of the fare
spread before him and can distinguish between what is well prepared and what is not.
Furthermore, this guest has the ability to correctly choose by either accepting or rejecting the food
set before him. He may have any combination of food as long as it does not make him ill; neither
would he become stronger from becoming unpleasantly satiated by an wrong combination of
ingredients.
We may also add that if a person is removed from a banquet due to drunkenness or is
about to become intoxicated when the feast is about to end, the steward [J.89] in charge
gracefully prevents any trouble from those who are intoxicated and reeling from too much
alcohol. A person denied the enjoyment of a sweet odor [M.185] is not deprived of what he
yearns for but condemns this injustice and is cheated by reason of his own jealousy and lack of
foresight. But if anyone considers a repulsive circumstance of drunkenness when a person vomits,
becomes drowsy and talks nonsense, he has the compassion to make him refrain from such
immoderate behavior. Perhaps this example enables us to more easily keep our inquiry focused
upon the subject of our discussion. What do we mean here? What about divine grace when
parents apply all their effort and God prematurely snatches a child away before it has the chance
to mature? To persons posing these questions we again refer a banquet and a table loaded with
many fine delicacies (I believe that the skill of preparing food involves not just sweet and pleasant
items but more bitter ingredients used by experts to stimulate appetites). Since not all things in
life are agreeable but resemble either salt, something harsh, pungent, biting or [J.90] sharp for the
purpose of being ingested and contributing to a rich sauce, the bowls are disguised with all sorts
of ingredients. Some persons are pompous in their conceit, others provoke derangement among
those who are drinking, while some vomit shameful apostasy by malicious questions. A person
does not remain long at this banquet who does not comply to such behavior and leaves more
quickly in order not to affect the gathering by gluttony. I believe this example reveals the
operation of a perfect providence which not only cures conflicting passions but restrains them.
We suggest that infants die because he [God] who makes all things removes circumstances for
evil out of love for mankind. He does not give an occasion for choosing it through his
providential capacity which knows the effect of a depraved inclination to produce bad deeds.
Often a person fond of banquets denounces the deceptive compulsion of greed which
inclines them to evil. Thus in my opinion, they do not reveal the falsely veiled illness of avarice
through its misleading cover. Many boost of expanding [J.91] their avarice even further in order
to make their offspring more wealthy; they unmask their own illness which their unborn children
do not necessarily inherit. Many lack successors for whom they have toiled so much; since these
persons lack hope, they desire to rear numerous offspring who are unfettered by [M.188] this all-consuming illness.
If anyone freely chooses not to live well, for example, cruel tyrants, persons who are
slaves to every undiscipline, inclined to anger and who do not refrain from incurable corrupt
deeds, thieves, murderers, traitorous fathers, or if there is anything more detestable than putting
to death their fathers, mothers, children and engaging in unlawful activities, and if such persons
grow old in evil, how do such persons illumine our earlier observations? If an infant's premature
death prevents him from craving this life's pleasures such as banquets, how does the banquet of
life prophetically reveal that he behave in a drunken manner until reaching old age, does harm to
himself, and inflicts his guests with the stale dregs of evil? (23) Our response is that God's
providence does not fail to take these instances into account. The measure of evil gradually
decreases through the various stages of life [J.92] and restores purity through the fullness of those
who have been saved, a fact which is evident for those who realize God's power. For who is
unattentive to God's nature while contemplating his works and is blind to his surpassing power by
a flawed inclination of the will? If anyone wish to seek in a human manner, he will find it more
difficult to discover the existence of heaven, earth and everything in creation and to lead the
deceived soul back to life so that [God's] loving will might not be in vain. Whoever lacks divine
assistance has an abundance of evil in life. The Maker of life has bestowed life, whereas one's free
choice causes harm; without this inclination man would not be completely wicked. By itself, evil
lacks existence but is the result of choice when one decides to live in sin. Thus if God does not
cause evil, no longer would there be good reason for it to exist in a person.
But why, as you say, does [God's] compassionate providence snatch someone away before
his will develops the ability to do evil and [J.93] permits this to happen to a person who has not
yet been born [cf. Mt 26.24]? We respond to these more plausible objections by saying that there
is often a better goal in mind for those who have lived well. Divinely inspired Scripture provides
many witnesses where we learn about God's care for those worthy to share it. Since the text
makes conjectures about unclear matters, our minds frequently lack proof. Not only is God
gracious to parents responsible for bring a human being into existence by taking away a person
from living immorally, but if nothing of the sort is found when they have been prematurely
snatched away, it is sensible to consider which is more difficult: persons restrained from an
immoral life or those known for living in sin. Many instances have taught us that nothing happens
without God's aid. It is not without chance and logic that divine care administers everything when
we know that God is the reason, wisdom, virtue and truth. He does not lack purpose, wisdom,
virtue, truth, remains active and is not connected with anything untruthful.
Whether anyone is snatched away as a result of what we have already mentioned or for
some other reason, [J.94] we should admit that these calamities happen for a better purpose. I
know another reason taught by the wise Apostle, namely, that some persons abounding in iniquity
were permitted to live [M.189] according to their own free choice [Rom 9.14,19]. For a person
trained in the teaching of Letter to the Romans who has subjected himself to what is contrary to
it, can be accused of evil. If evil is from God, nothing would then exist because he would be
irresponsible for governing creation; thus a more profound examination of this matter would
dissolve any objections. [Paul] says that God bestows to each person what he deserves and gives
evil to some by his good intent [Rom 2.6ff]. Therefore he inflicted evil to newly born children,
especially the Egyptian tyrant's son, to teach Israel by this calamity because there were very
numerous [Rom 9.17]. God's power is equally made known through all persons and is beneficial
for those worthy of it. He inflicts punishment due to evil behavior because it benefits the people
which left Egypt, not that the Egyptians were evil in their ways. Therefore God's adversary,
[J.95] Pharaoh, served as a champion and ally for those who did good; in this instance the two-fold operation of God became evident, and Israel obtained knowledge of it. He [Pharaoh] learned
what is better for himself and seeing what is more lamentable and deserving of chastisement,
realized God's superabundant wisdom which puts evil at the service of those who perform good
deeds. Take the example of an artisan's work (if the Apostle's words confirm ours) who skillfully
beats iron and makes it pliant for useful implements. Since this rigid material is not malleable, it is
not easily softened by fire and fashioned into a functional instrument by reason of its hardness
which is the goal of this trade; he uses an anvil so that by hitting iron, it becomes easily worked
and soft, thereby resulting in a practical implement.
But someone may say that we cannot eradicate every depravity from life since virtuous
persons cannot attain it by their own efforts. What, then, is the advantage for people to live
dishonorably? Allow me to add something more sublime to these human views. The great David
prophetically said that happiness lies in virtuous deeds when he contrasts the destruction of
condemned persons with [J.96] those who are good: "The just man will rejoice when he sees
vengeance on the impious; he will wash his hands in the blood of the sinner" [Ps 57.11]. He does
not rejoice over their sorrows but realizes the result of living virtuously. These words signify that
the acquisition of joy and its increase for virtuous persons is opposed to those living in evil.
[David] says "He will wash his hands in the blood of the sinner," showing that purity attained by
virtuous deeds consists in the destruction of sin. Washing signifies a reflection of purity. No one
washes in blood except to defile himself, making the blessedness of virtue clear by this comparison
with sinful persons.
We have added these remarks to the subject of our essay in order to remember them more
easily. The death of infants prevents grief from afflicting them their life is over; neither do they
share that virtue which belongs to those who have been purified because God's foresight had
prevented them from an excess of evil should they have lived. The evil path of some persons
thwarts this because thanks to their parents, they are prevented from doing harm. But in some
instances, their parents do not teach them to confide in God nor to live properly. Often a person
known for his cruel behavior would go unchecked, but a vile death prevents this. Also, if some
attained [J.97] the highest degree of depravity, consideration of the Apostle's words offers
consolation by mentioning [God] who made everything in wisdom and who brought about good
through evil [cf. Ps 103.24]. If anyone persists in immoderate evil and is of no value for God's
purpose, we mention those who have lived well who, as the Prophet [David] suggests, are by no
means insignificant nor unsuitable for revealing God's providence.
1. The critical text, Pros `Ierion: Peri ton pro Oras Anarpazomenon Nepion (De Infantibus Praemature Abreptis), is found in Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora, Pars II (Leiden, 1987). Edited by Hadwiga Horner, pp.67-97. The critical edition to Gregory of Nyssa's works was begun under the direction of Werner Jaeger and continued after his death. Therefore, reference to his writings in this Introduction will be marked by the letter "J" followed by the appropriate page and line number. The same method is followed within the translation of Infants. The translation also contains reference to J.P. Migne's text. The Migne edition, volume 44.161-192, (Paris, 1858) is indicated by the letter "M" followed by the appropriate column number.
2. "Hierius ist zwar nicht selbst Monch geworden--in diesem Fall ware der rhetorische Aufwand der Scrift unangemessen--scheint sich aber doch auch personlich weitgehend einem `philosophischen Leben' zugewandt zu haben." An article entitled "Die Entstehungszeit des Traktats `De Infantibus Praemature Abreptis' des Gregor von Nyssa" by G. May: Acta Colloquii Gregoriani III (Leiden, 1974), p.92.
3. "...Gregory does not seem to be concerned with maintaining the salvation of the infants in question [i.e., those who have died prematurely], but with the justice of their reward." An article entitled "The Fall of Man and Original Sin in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa" by Ernest V. McClear, sj, Theological Studies #9, (Baltimore, 1948), p.207. McClear later observes that failure to mention baptism may be attributed to the fact that Hierios, to whom the treatise is addressed, is a well-informed theologian "Who asked not about the salvation of children, but about the justice of their reward." (p.209)
4. Taxis is closely related to another key word, akolouthia, which means "sequence," "order." For a fuller treatment of this concept, refer to an article by Jean Danielou, "Akolouthia chez Gregoire de Nysse" in Revue des Sciences Religieuses (Paris, 1953), pp.219-249.
5. Metousia Theou: Man's Participation in God's Perfections According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa (Rome, 1966), p.95.
6. In Illud: Tunc et Ipse Filius (PG44, 1313 B-C).
7. "Das Ende ist schon im Anfang, die vollendete Gestalt des Leibes in ihrem Keime anwesend, weil Angang und Ende wie ein Prinzip mit seinem Endergebnis durch einen notwendigen Entwicklungsgang verknuft sind." Die Einheit Des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa by Reinhard M. Hubner (Leiden, 1974), p.101.
8. For a fuller treatment of this word, refer to Jean Danielou's Platonisme et Theologie Mystique (Paris, 1944), pp.291-307.
9. "Diastema and Diastsis in Gregory of Nyssa. Introduction to a Concept and the Posing of a Problem," an article in Gregory von Nyssa und die Philosophie, edited by H. Dorrie, M. Altenburger, U. Schramm (Leiden, 1976), p.252.
10. "We can conceive no mental image of such a gap [diastema], but it is our experience." Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence by Paulos Mar Gregorios (New York, 1988), p.95.
11. An article entitled "Gregoire de Nyssa `Sur Les Enfants Morts Prematurement'" in Vigiliae Christianae #20 (Amsterdam, 1966), p.163. Danielou mentions Christian sources which have influenced Gregory of Nyssa's reflections on infant mortality such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Jerome and Methodios of Olympios. Cf. pp.167-170.
12. Cf. J.70.7 where Gregory alludes to "the wise Plato" with reference to The Republic, 614B-C. Within this context, A.D. Nock has observed, "Long before the emergence of schematic theories, children dying in infancy did not receive funerary libations and were sometimes disposed in some manner other than that used for dead adults; they had not entered and were not leaving life in its fullness. It is natural to think of the dead as continuing to be at the age at which they died...In the Homeric Hades, which was always there in the background, the dead went on doing what they had done in life." Excerpted from an article entitled "Tertullian and the Ahori" from Vigiliae Christianae #4 (Amsterdam, 1950), pp.132-133. In this same article Nock makes allusion to the ahori or those (infants) who died without sin, pp.107-112. Also, cf. Tertullian's De Anima, 56,8.
13. "La necessite de poser la question non en fonction de la problematique de la retribution, mais de celle de la nature humaine apparait du fait que c'est seulement selon la seconde que le probleme de l'avenir eternel des enfants morts a leur naissance peut se poser." Ibid, Vigiliae Christianae #20, p.175.
14. An article entitled "La Croissance De l'Ame dans La Connaissance selon Le `De Infantibus': La Doctrine et Ses Metaphores." From: Acta Colloquii Gregoriani III (Leiden, 1974), pp.100-101.
15. For example, "We can never see the stars' hidden location, but they all lead the mind to above through wisdom." (J.71.20-21)
16. "the soul's participation in God and that knowledge which shares in it." (J.80.22-23)
17. Ibid, p.95.
18. An article entitled "Gregory of Nyssa and the Simile of the Banquet of Life," Vigiliae Christianae #30 (Amsterdam, 1976), p.58.
19. Compare another image of a banquet taken from Gregory's Commentary on Ecclesiastes, J.438-439: Since reason deviated both from the correct use of [God's] benefits and from what he appointed through evil counsel, man exchanged the time of useful actions for evil ones. This resembles a table which talented persons have carefully laid out to make a meal enjoyable and full of good cheer along with delicate cutlery for carving meat and silver soup spoons. Then some of the invited guests either cut themselves with a sword or a similar weapon; they either strike their own eye or another's, for they have turned what they were offered into something disrespectful. A banquet may be said to suffer abuse if a person fails to abide by the reason for which the guests were invited; instead, he introduces an evil use for passion among those who are unwilling to partake of it.
20. "The just man will rejoice when he sees vengeance on the impious; he will wash his hands in the blood of the sinner." (J.96.1-3)
21. "Le Traite `Sur les Enfants Morts Prematurement' de Gregoire de Nysse." Ibid, pp.181-182. On the other hand, G. May ("Die Entstehungszeit des Traktats `De Infantibus Praemature Abreptis' des Gregor von Nyssa," ibid, pp.92-96) dates Infants to the year 381. The reason for this date is because the treatise is related to Concerning Those Who Have Died which was composed approximately the same time (cf. p.95).
22. Cf. The Republic, 614b ff.
23. The Migne edition does not include the following lines in Hadwig Horner's critical text: J.92.22 through J.93.20.