When taking into consideration the New Testament accounts of Jesus Christ, one does not discover a developed theological account of his person. Rather, the message or kerugma found there depicts a person who fully shares our human characteristics: Jesus interacts with his friends, enemies and environment yet at the same time he stands apart from them as someone different from the rest of us. This dissimilarity results both from the claims Jesus says with regard to his own person, his relationship with God and most dramatically of all, his miracles. Despite the tantalizing picture handed down to us in the Gospels, we are completely ignorant as to what we would now designate as his awareness or mental experience. In other words, Jesus eludes any attempt to subject his person to psychological investigation.

As the early Church expanded and came into contact with the larger Hellenistic world, it was compelled to translate the message of the Gospels to non-Judaic peoples and to make use of their philosophic heritage. One of the pressing issues confronting Christian apologetics at the time was the personhood of Jesus Christ who was proclaimed as both man and God. The very fact that such a duality could be attributed to a single person was a source of agitation among those educated Greeks being evangelized as well as Christians who were engaged in proclaiming the faith. Several centuries of occasionally heated discussion in the Church were required to resolve the difficulty of two natures in Christ, human and divine. It was not until 451 when the Council of Chalcedon settled the earlier Christological disputes. Briefly put, Chalcedon articulated the unity of these two natures⁽¹⁾ though in abstract terms.

From the vantage point of Chalcedon with its clearly defined teaching on the two natures of Christ we can look backwards, so to speak, upon the teachings of Apollinarius of Laodecia (310-c.390). In many ways he brings to a head the conflicting elements of the great Christological disputes of the fourth century, controversies which can be confusing even to the trained eye. The question of the full humanity of Jesus Christ, that is, his possession of body and soul, have direct bearing upon the question of human freedom. Although Christ fully assumed the human condition, a number of Christian apologetics subtly viewed his personhood in a Docetist fashion. When the Church Fathers sought to defend themselves against such a teaching, especially when referring to the Incarnation, they developed two frameworks which scholars commonly call Logos-sarx (Word-flesh) and Logos-anthropos (Word-man). The former was developed in reaction to Origen's doctrine on the preexistence of souls. This view failed to account for a human soul in Christ; instead, the Incarnation was perceived as a union of the Logos with human flesh⁽²⁾. On the other hand, the latter framework had as its basic principle the notion that the Logos united himself with a complete humanity, including a soul and a body. In patristic scholarship these two types of Christologies have been termed Alexandrian and Antiochene, respectively. Although such a division runs the risk of over-simplification, it provides us with a rule of thumb and enables us to make our way through this often confused period of Church doctrine. What must be kept in mind is that both the Logos-sarx and Logos-anthropos Christologies affirm that the person of Jesus Christ entered into union with mankind. In other words, Christ was not perceived as a divinely inspired man after the fashion of Arius and his followers.

Apollinarius was one of the most famous personages associated with the Antiochene school and became bishop of Laodicea, a town about fifty miles south of Antioch on the Syrian coast⁽³⁾. He was regarded as a person of immense literary accomplishment who together with his father sought during the pagan revival under the emperor Julian to disguise the Christian scriptures in classic forms. They both composed the Gospels in the form of Platonic dialogues and some of the Old Testament books into heroic verse. The writings of Apollinarius and his father (who had the same name) sometimes took poetic form; they enjoyed immense popularity during this time of persecution and enabled the faithful to maintain their Christian roots during such difficulties. A number of famous persons had attended the lectures of Apollinarius such as Jerome which enjoyed great renown at the time. However, it was about this period that the Christology of Apollinarius was beginning to be suspect as deviated from the orthodox position of the Church.

Despite the geographical proximity to Antioch, it is more natural to associate Apollinarius with Alexandria (his father came from that city) and its teaching on the sharp division between two natures in Christ which later gave birth to Nestorianism. At a later time Cyril of Alexandria was to take over some basic tenets of Apollinarius' thought, especially his famous mia phusis or one nature of the incarnate Word⁽⁴⁾. Apollinarius enjoyed a close friendship with Athanasius, the famous bishop of Alexandria, and shared many of his views on Trinitarian doctrines. Such a friendship makes it more natural to affiliate Apollinarius with Alexandria rather than with Antioch. In the eyes of Athanasius, his friend from Laodicea steadfastly held fast to the orthodox teaching of Nikaea.

It may be helpful to briefly state the position Athanasius maintained on the person of Christ which serves to give a better picture of Apollinarius' doctrine of the Savior. The bishop of Alexandria is known for his monumental struggles against Arianism, the teaching which claimed that the Son of God was created by the Father from nothing as an instrument for creation and salvation. Christ was not God by nature but a noble creature who received the title of Son of God due to his righteousness which had been foreseen by the Father. Athanasius stressed the unity between Logos and flesh while each retains their own characteristics in a close unity. Such an "indwelling framework"⁽⁵⁾ was the object of reproach and conflict with the Antiochene school who favored the Logos-anthropos Christology. On the other hand, the school of Alexandria, whose most famous son was Origen, seemed to treat the flesh as a thing in which the Word made his home. In their minds it created an unnecessary dualistic approach to the person of Christ and devalued the role of human personhood.

For Athanasius the Logos-sarx framework is the source of all existence and subject of statements about Christ. The human aspect in Christ is ruled by the Logos, a position which has lead scholars to believe that Athanasius did not ascribe to a human soul in the Savior⁽⁶⁾. For him, to "become man" or flesh implies an intimate union between the divine and human to such an extent that it may be said that the Logos is actually man. We will see later how this position maintained by Athanasius in his struggle against Arianism which sought to denigrate the role of Jesus Christ influenced his friend Apollinarius. The position which Apollinarius has subsequently taken flows from the basic principles of Athanasius' theology. It maintains that God is the only one who can save, an insight which had been hammered out in his controversy with the Arian opposition. For Athanasius, salvation rested upon the incarnation of divinity in all its unchangeable glory; the changeable human mind which is liable to sin could not conceivably be united with the atreptos nature of divinity.

Due to the influence of Athanasius, Apollinarius must have had his position in mind which implied that Christ lacked a human mind or soul; salvation for mankind depends totally upon the immutable power of God through the Incarnation minus any cooperation from the human sphere. For Gregory, perfection is not immutability but a progression towards the good which involves correct moral behavior and alteration. It is this notion of change which enables Gregory to respond to Apollinarius, "Since the human mind is mutable, it is unable to have knowledge of the Only-Begotten God and to speak of its origin" (J.194). However, he accepts the premise of Apollinarius that the human spirit is mutable (treptos)⁽⁷⁾, "The human race and the entire man is not saved by the assumption of mind but by assuming flesh, its natural governing principle. The immutable mind does not require submission to the flesh by any defect of knowledge; rather, it unites the flesh to itself without coercion" (J.195). However, for Apollinarius this mutability belongs to free will's ability to chose between good and evil. If the nous (mind) is mutable by nature, the Logos clearly cannot have assumed a human mind. To this accusation Gregory responds, "just as [Christ] was not defiled by his birth in the flesh, neither is the mind (nous) diminished by assuming mutability (trope," J.195). For him trope implies that the spirit does not consist solely in alternation between good and evil. The human spirit is able to become atreptos and be healed from the inclination towards evil without at the same time ceasing to be a created spirit, for even the human nature of Christ uses trope towards the good.

The writings of Apollinarius confront us with the problem of a dichotomy or more specifically, a trichotomy, soul/spirit-flesh. The bishop of Laodecia maintains that man is an enfleshed mind, a composite of spirit and flesh, pneuma and sarx. As a source for these terms he refers to St. Paul whose apparently trichotomist terms appeal to him. Since both man and the Logos are enfleshed minds (nous ensarkos), to be made in man's likeness means that the Logos has an enfleshed mind. It was the intent of Apollinarius not to pay too much attention to such terminology; rather, his concern laid in preferring the God enfleshed (theos ensarkos) with an inspired man (anthropos entheos), for this latter phrase implies a created mind enlightened by wisdom⁽⁸⁾. In addition to this, Apollinarius is fond of St. Paul's term, a "heavenly man." Gregory of Nyssa levels an especially strong invective against this position, claiming that the flesh of the divine Logos preexisted in heaven right from the beginning. As Raven has demonstrated⁽⁹⁾, such a view was held by some of his more extreme followers while the fragments assembled by Lietzmann do not reveal this fact.

Apollinarius has taken up the teaching of Athanasius, that God must remain immutable in order to save us. The difficulty he experiences lies in the problem of how God can assume a middle position between his own divinity and humanity. Gregory scoffs at this by presenting the example of a goat-stag (tragelaphos, J.215-16). Here he mocks Apollinarius' position who calls Christ a Man-God: "the combination of names [goat and stag] denotes the participation of one nature in another." For the bishop of Laodicea Christ is not an Arian demiurge standing midway between full divinity and humanity; rather, he is a mixis or mixture of both components. Regardless of the source of his teaching and whether or not it comes from scripture, Apollinarius penned his thoughts out of a formidable literary and scholarly background. He upheld the homoousion, that the Trinity is one as proclaimed by Nikaea. Despite this noble defense of the faith and the admiration of his friend Athanasius, Apollinarius was condemned for heresy by the Council of Constantinople in 381, by the pope in the late 370's, and by a local synod at Antioch.

Despite the close affiliation with Antioch, Apollinarius perceived the humanistic approach of this school as threat to Christ's nature by dividing it into two elements. It thereby rendered him into something akin to a divinely inspired man whose Arian counterpart was the belief that Christ was a lesser god. Apollinarius undertook what was perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to date at theologizing about the personhood of Christ. The salient point of his teaching is the rejection of a human mind in Jesus, something akin to Arianism. Nevertheless, as J.N.D. Kelly has pointed out⁽¹⁰⁾, Apollinarius was a powerful antagonist against the Arians regarding Trinitarian matters, so it seems unusual that such a figure would succumb to their Christological principles. We have also observed that the great Athanasius tended to neglect the presence of a human soul in Christ, a feature of the Alexandrian school in general. The sometimes rigid manner of their Logos-sarx framework which makes the Logos the soul in Christ has an innate tendency of treating the Logos as something secondary. Apollinarius had understood that the Father and Son form one identical divine substance, a position taught by his friend Athanasius. However, problems arose when he turned his sharp mind to Christology.

In attempting to conceive Christ's preexistence, Apollinarius is fully orthodox and wields this belief against the Arians who subscribed to the position that Christ had one (human) nature and was a divine though created being⁽¹¹⁾. However, when he treating the Incarnation, Apollinarius slips from the orthodox perception of Christ and says that he has only one true (divine) nature. Apollinarius arrives at such a conclusion by the application of rational investigation⁽¹²⁾ which is intended to bolster faith. If this approach were not taken, Christians would fall into error for "it behooves Christians to be inquisitive and not to imprudently be unmindful of the opinions belonging to either the Greeks or Jews" (J.135).

In accord with Church teaching, Apollinarius believed that Jesus Christ has fully redeemed humanity. He is the only mediator between God and man, a fact which led Apollinarius to maintain that if God were a unity, Christ himself must be a unity. If the divine element were simply united with mankind, we would have two sons, one of God by nature and the other by adoption. In this light the flesh of Christ is not added to divinity but constitutes one nature with the Godhead, a fact which prompted Gregory of Nyssa to write his treatise against the bishop of Laodicea. Hence the Incarnation showed that a physical body was joined with the immutable divine Logos. When John said "the Word became flesh," Apollinarius interpreted this as the Logos taking on flesh without assuming a human mind, the source of evil and unbecoming thoughts. For Apollinarius, the Logos is the sole life of Jesus, the God-man, even down to the physical level. He thereby constitutes one living unity in whom the soul directs and the body follows this direction. No conflict of wills is present in this view of Jesus, a basic tenet of the Antiochene school we have mentioned above and against which Apollinarius rebelled.

Apollinarius maintained that the body does not by itself compose a nature because it is not the source of vivification. On the other hand, the Word cannot be perceived as a separate nature apart from his incarnate state since the Lord dwelt with us in the flesh. The Incarnation represents a self-emptying of the Word in order to assume human flesh; keep in mind, though, that Christ does not empty himself of mind but there does remain the mind of the Savior. Nevertheless, the flesh of Christ did not descend to us from heaven, nor is his flesh on earth consubstantial with God as Gregory of Nyssa wrongly perceived Apollinarius as teaching; rather, his flesh is God inasmuch as it is united with divinity to form one person.

Such a doctrine reminds one of Arius who viewed the Son (who was not divine) as the soul of Christ, whereas Apollinarius denied a rational soul or human mind to Christ so that the Son would not be open to change, a characteristic belonging to the created realm. As a consequence, the flesh of Christ is the very flesh of God which is to be worshipped. While remaining God, the Logos shares the properties belonging to the flesh, and the flesh, while remaining flesh in its union with the Godhead, shares the properties belonging to God. This view offered by Apollinarius safeguards the unity of Word and flesh in Jesus Christ and demonstrated his full divinity. On the other hand, it undermined the humanity of Christ. If the divinity assumed the place of the human mind, how does God touch the rest of mankind? Soul and flesh lacking intellect (man's most essential component) do not constitute man. The teaching of Chalcedon towards which the Church was moving would have been inconceivable for Apollinarius: one person containing two natures. It would follow that Christ lacked a human mind due to its mutability and hence, its tendency to sin, and Apollinarius seems to excuse persons who sin with their minds: he has already demonstrated that even God cannot heal this human mind.

Despite the well-known opposition of Apollinarius to Arius, both men seem to have possessed a similar Christology in that the Logos replaced the human soul in Christ. One sometimes wonder whether or not Apollinarius assumed this view held earlier by Arius and incorporated it into his own teaching⁽¹³⁾. He opposed any reference of human attributes to God, notably mutability, while at the same time shunning those who may separate human components from God, a reason for his stress upon the unity of divinity with human flesh. Apollinarius also came into conflict with a contemporary of his, Diodore of Tarsus, and both were noted by a tendency to shun allegorical interpretation of scripture. The fragments of Apollinarius handed down to us reveal his concern about the tendency of Antiochene Christology as represented by Diodore to join a man to God. Such a view is more plausible than the one claiming that Apollinarius borrowed some of his insights from the Arians. Indeed, there seems to have been a common thread of presuppositions propagated throughout the area to which Apollinarius had put his own peculiar interpretation upon them.

Together with this notion of a common source to Apollinarius and Arius, we have Muhlenberg's view⁽¹⁴⁾ that Apollinarius desired to contrast Christ as theos ensarkos, the enfleshed God, with the anthropos entheos, the inspired man who mediated knowledge of God. Apollinarius stressed the role of the divine mind as being enfleshed, a notion which appears to have come from his belief that the personhood of Jesus Christ as being fully identified with God could not be compromised with any pagan philosophy. The presence of a human mind in Christ would therefore abolish any distinctive characteristic of Christianity. The presentation of Apollinarius' actual teaching is extremely difficult although the work of H. Lietzmann in 1904 have done much to clarify the issue⁽¹⁵⁾. Although we safely assume from a study of the fragments that Apollinarius conceived of the Logos taking the place of the human mind in Jesus Christ at the Incarnation, the real intent of Apollinarius, there nevertheless remain difficulties as to his exact meaning.

The Treatise Against Apollinarius (also know by its Latin title, Antirrheticus)⁽¹⁶⁾

was composed by Gregory of Nyssa to combat the suspicious teachings of Apollinarius as represented by excerpts from his Apodeixis. Gregory employs the likeness of the lost sheep⁽¹⁷⁾ to illustrate his argument against what he believed was the belief that Christ's flesh preexisted. Prefacing his remarks to this parable with a quote from Apollinarius he says, "'The man Christ preexisted not as another Spirit existing apart from him, that is, God; rather, the Lord had the nature of a divine man while remaining a divine Spirit" (J.147). The basic message of this text is that the Spirit is identified with a preexistent man. In other words, the Lord in the nature of the God-man was the divine Spirit. The rebuttal to this position follows in J.148: "[Apollinarius] is convinced that Christ became manifest through flesh from the Virgin not only according to the eternity of his divinity as we believe, but also according to his flesh which preexisted creation." As we have said above, this was an incorrect interpretation of Apollinarius' teaching as fragment 140 offered by Lietzmann indicates⁽¹⁸⁾.

Following this passage Gregory of Nyssa continues in an invective tone against Apollinarius by employing quotations which pertain to Christ's divine preexistence: "Before Abraham was, I am" [Jn 8.58] and "He existed before me" [Jn 1.15] (cf. J.148.5 & 7). A bit earlier in his treatise Gregory again quotes from Apollinarius⁽¹⁹⁾, "Since Christ as God has a soul and body along with spirit, that is the mind, one may naturally say that he is a man from heaven" (J.143). This passage is an elaboration upon 1Cor 15.45⁽²⁰⁾, "The first man Adam was made a living soul (psuche); the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit (pneuma)"⁽²¹⁾. Apollinarius elaborates upon this verse by saying, "The second man from heaven is spiritual. This signifies that the man united with God lacks an intelligence of his own" (J.145). In these two passages Apollinarius sees a confirmation of his Christology, namely, that the Logos is unable to be complete by uniting his divinity with humanity. "What can be clearer? Opposites cannot be united, that is, perfect God with perfect man" (J.162). Instead, the divine pneuma takes the place of reason, man's pneuma, in the Incarnation. As Apollinarius states, "But the man [Christ] did not come from the earth as commonly assumed; rather, God descended from heaven and united himself to human nature" (J.182). In his view only this kind of Incarnation is able to guarantee the unity of the personhood of Christ as well as mankind's redemption⁽²²⁾. This is possible only because Apollinarius says that Christ has a soul and body along with spirit (cf. J.143) as a man from heaven. At this juncture we see that Apollinarius holds that the divine pneuma or nous is man's most important characteristic: "But he who was crucified was not divine by nature; this did not belong to him although he is spirit" (J.172). Gregory leaves the choice of positions up to the readers of his treatise saying "Let a person carefully judge...whether our opinion which says that the divine glory dwelt in our land out of love for us, as Apollinarius says, the flesh belonging to God was not newly acquired out of his bounty but was consubstantial (sunousiomene) and connatural (sumphutos) with him" (J.154).

Gregory of Nyssa uses Eph 1.7 ("in whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the richness of his grace") to show that the divine Logos did not have flesh from all eternity. He then proceeds with an exquisite exegesis of the lost sheep (Lk 15.5, Mt 18.12) where Christ is depicted as the good shepherd who becomes one with the sheep he took on himself. This passage plays a crucial role in Gregory's interpretation of our redemption and by implication, the Church, since it is composed of those who have been redeemed by Christ. The essence of his exegesis directed against Apollinarius reads in J.153, "But having imparted himself to us by his own body and soul, Christ opened paradise for the thief by destroying the power of corruption. And the destruction of death renders corruption powerless by God's life-giving power, for his bounty and grace partake of our human nature. Thus he who shares both parts [body and soul] unites through his resurrection that which has been dispersed." This part of his treatise lies at the close of the paragraph just preceding it where Christ "sanctified the entire mass of our human nature by that first fruits" (aparche). This word plays an important role in a short treatise by Gregory⁽²³⁾.

Refer now to J.144 where Prov 9.1 is quoted by Gregory, "'Wisdom built a house for herself' by forming earth into a man from the Virgin through which he became united with humanity." This verse is intended to counter Apollinarius' perception that Christ had human flesh preexisting in heaven as we have seen earlier. Later on (cf. J.223-24) Gregory speaks of the Virgin as being the one through whom the First Fruits (aparche) as New Man (Ho kainos anthropos) must united a human body and soul to himself to redeem all mankind: "Just as this creative power brings man into existence by a union of body and soul, so does the power of the Most High exercise itself with regard to the Virgin's immaculate body in an immaterial fashion through the vivifying Spirit...He (the New Man, Christ) was formed according to God, not man, since the divine power equally pervaded his entire constitution. As a result, both parts of his constitution partook of divinity and had a harmonious composition of soul and body."

In J.151 Gregory accuses Apollinarius of holding that Christ's humanity preexists and that his Incarnation has no meaning. Here he similarly puts the bishop of Laodecia in the same impious category of Arius and Eunomius⁽²⁴⁾. Against the contention which holds that the Logos had preexistent human flesh, Gregory says that in the "last days" (ep'eschaton hemeron, implying Heb 1.2), Christ as first fruits (aparche) bound himself with our earthly, human nature. Such a union does not suggest that a completion was conveyed to our human nature through the First Born; rather, it is a completion in both body and soul. However Gregory does not subscribe to such consubstantiality; the fact that Christ "who bears the sheep upon himself impresses no trace of sin nor of going astray" (J.152) signifies that he by nature is separate from humanity⁽²⁵⁾.

R. Hubner says that we should view Eph 1.7 in connection with another verse from scripture, Heb 2.14⁽²⁶⁾. This verse lies in the background of J.153-4 where Gregory speaks of Christ as priest and lamb through his passion and resurrection. He is called "Originator" (archegos) of our life (J.154) through his priestly activity. Although the body and soul are separated at the point of death, the former undergoes corruption while the latter remains incorruptible. As the bishop of Nyssa says, "God resurrected man to union with him after the separation of body and soul and their subsequent union, resulting in total salvation for human nature" (J.154). This passage is intended to counter Apollinarius' claim that the Redeemer maintains a certain homogeneity with those he has redeemed.

At this point I wish to set forth the division of Gregory's Treatise Against Apollinarius as divided into nine sections according to the scheme offered by Muhlenberg⁽²⁷⁾:

1) Introduction: correct perception of the faith is the enlargement of the flock (Church). J.131-2.

2) Against Apollinarius' claim that in Jesus God had suffered death, Gregory counters with his own teaching that in Jesus, both divinity and humanity are clearly distinguished. J.133-47.

3) Against the claim of the eternity of Christ's physical body, Gregory maintains that the Incarnation occurred within space and time. Christ assumed our humanity and raised it up. J.147-62.

4) Christ's humanity is essentially human nature. He did not lack reason. J.162-84.

5) Against Apollinarius' contention that Christ was an enfleshed mind (nous ensarkos), Gregory teaches the distinction of two natures in the Redeemer. J.185-94.

6) Against the doctrine that Christ lacked reason, Gregory shows that all capacity for virtue which Jesus shows to mankind requires reason for it to function. J.194-9.

7) Gregory demonstrates against Apollinarius the unity of Christ's divine nature in the Incarnation and teaches that Christ is composed of two different natures, not simply one. J.199-208.

8) Gregory shows that a trichotomist understanding of human nature cannot be applied to Christ, that Christ is perfect man and perfect God, and that after the resurrection Christ's humanity is transformed as well as ours. J.208-30.

9) Conclusion: the Apollinarist significance of Christ's passion must be avoided. Gregory concludes with a brief passage from Apollinarius. J.230-33.

As Muhlenberg correctly says, this outline does not bring out all the fine points of Apollinarius' theology. Gregory has taken a thematic approach to Apodeixis and attempts to see their inner unity that he may counter with an orthodox position.

For Apollinarius, any form of union with Christ which combines the divine Logos with a human soul leads to submerging the human in the divine and therefore to a loss of freedom on our part. Gregory often touches upon this critical notion of freedom in his treatise as in J.141: "This faculty [free choice] belongs to the mind and is not found among infants. How can a person [referring to Apollinarius] who opposes and reduces free will to servility lack a mind?" As Gregory later says in this same section, the freedom to chose is what is most noble in man, and for Christ to lack such a choice, as Apollinarius would have it in his theology, is an offensive interpretation of scripture. Yet it is paradoxical that Apollinarius decided to oppose the Antiochene tendency to stress this freedom of choice. Such a faculty is free yet weak. "How, as [Apollinarius] says, can flesh be joined to God without coercion and share in pure virtue? For who does not know that the correct action of free choice is virtue? The flesh is a vehicle of free choice led by the impulse of discretion, for free choice would be nothing if it were not for mind and disposition" (J.197-8). Just below this passage (J.199), Gregory defends this faculty in face of Apollinarius' belief that it is swallowed up into Christ's divinity: "Not only is the mind in man but it is more noble than everything else. The free, unconstrained inclination for the good is a perfect witness to the mind" (J.199).

The kind of union espoused by Apollinarius stems from his Platonist view of man's soul as the principle of life which distinguishes it from the inanimate realm. Here all sentient beings, human beings and animals, possess a soul, so there is nothing especially distinctive in this faculty. On the other hand, spirit (pneuma) comes directly from God, the means by which man perceives intelligible realities, and sets him off from the beasts. Because this spirit is divine in origin it has a natural similarity for the Holy Spirit which can easily take the place of a man without distorting his humanity. And when this view is shifted to the incarnate Christ, Apollinarius presents us with a divine man incapable of mutability and therefore of choice. Granted this is an attractive solution for a problem with which we are all familiar. Keeping in mind Apollinarius' Platonic view, he transferred the notion of the spirit's escape from the material realm to our resurrection in Christ. As a result, he could depict Christ as have one (divine) will without peril to either his divinity or humanity. Apollinarius taught that in Christ the human spirit as distinct from soul was substituted by the indwelling Holy Spirit of the Logos.

By denying a rational soul to Christ Apollinarius came to the conclusion that Jesus was devoid of human nature. On the other hand, he bestowed him with an irrational with an irrational soul (animal nature). It seems that the irrational body of Christ lacks the dignity of a nature but has some form of reality. The combination in his person of divinity and this irrational body is a mixture (mixis) resulting in something new unlike either of the constituent parts. Wolfson⁽²⁸⁾ believes that this belief has its roots in Greek chemistry, especially in Aristotle's conception of predominance reflected in Apollinarius. This means that the union of the irrational soul with the Logos, the latter retains its nature but the irrational soul does not, just its quality. When applied to the personhood of Jesus Christ, Apollinarius claims that the divine nature of the Logos became incarnate in him while his body retained its irrational soul and therefore suffer. It seems that Gregory of Nyssa misunderstood Apollinarius on these grounds, saying that "the Only-Begotten Son's divinity is mortal and...that his impassible, immutable nature is subject to change and passion" (J.136).

Apollinarius shifted from a trichotomist (J.186-7) anthropology to account for references in scripture to Christ's soul to a dichotomist position in the face of criticism. Here he has the Logos taking the place of the human intellect in Christ while retaining an irrational soul as Wolfson has pointed out just above. Apollinarius' Apodeixis naturally follows into the former stage of his development where the Logos takes the place of pneuma or nous in Christ's humanity. Both the trichotomist and dichotomist phases of Apollinarius have as their common feature a stress on the Logos as governing principle and the passivity of the flesh, only the former group of writings gives more attention to the Logos as the soul ruler of the flesh. These terms were more popular in nature and did not belong to any particular school of philosophy. Both phases do not lack the so-called communicatio idiomatum or exchange of properties. As Grillmeier has noted⁽²⁹⁾, this is not merely a logical-ontological matter for Apollinarius; rather, it acquires depth only if one plays close attention, as did Apollinarius, to the two kinds of being.

It is clear from the excerpts selected by Gregory of Nyssa in his treatise that Apollinarius takes his anthropology from the authority of St. Paul. The bishop of Laodicea finds the text 1Thes 5.23 especially crucial for his trichotomous position⁽³⁰⁾ even though Paul in other places speaks of a dichotomous soul-body relationship. In Gregory's words, "[Apollinarius] says...that the flesh is not inanimate, for this shows the spirit to be a third entity in addition to soul and body. 'If man consists of these three elements, the Lord is a man. Therefore, the Lord consists of three elements, spirit, soul, and body'" (J.209). R. Norris says that the division into dichotomy and trichotomy may be detected in Apollinarius' special used of St. Paul's pneuma-sarx expression. He points out references in Paul suggesting that these two aspects are not to be taken as implying a split in the constitution of a person⁽³¹⁾. It seems that for Apollinarius, the Pauline division of flesh-spirit points to a person's humanity and enables one to describe the composition of the Logos after the Incarnation when he assumed human nature.

It seems that in his zeal to defend the orthodox position Gregory of Nyssa had misunderstood Apollinarius on this important point; he failed to see that the bishop of Laodicea was attempting to formulate his Christological and anthropological views. For Apollinarius, spirit in the case of Christ means the Holy Spirit while in a human person it refers to a created spirit. It must be kept in mind that he was assailing the Antiochene tendency to perceive Christ in a dualistic fashion and desired to stress the unity between nature and person. It seems that any reflection upon the teaching of Apollinarius which is based upon unclear textual evidence such as the excerpted sections in Gregory's treatise must be treated with caution. Gregory seems to have overlooked the fact that Apollinarius intended to perceive the flesh assumed by Christ and incorporated into his person was not from eternity but formed a composite whole beginning at the Incarnation.

The insistence Apollinarius places upon the singularity of the divine Logos after the Incarnation does not imply, as Prestige has remarked⁽³²⁾, that he was a Monophysite. Although Gregory of Nyssa (as well as Gregory of Nazianzus) accuse Apollinarius of teaching that Christ's human nature preexisted, Scholars like Raven⁽³³⁾ have shown that this accusation was not justified because a clearer appreciation of Apollinarius' position has evolved from the fragments which have survived. Apollinarius says that "from the beginning" the Incarnation involves two aspects, a human birth and a heavenly descent. Gregory of Nyssa has taken the phrase "from the beginning" as from the beginning of creation, giving rise to a misrepresentation of Apollinarius' theology. Actually the bishop of Laodicea means that the human body in Christ has come to participate in God's uncreatedness; Christ is termed the heavenly Man because he descended from heaven to become man. It seems that if Apollinarius is to be accused of heresy, it lies in his belief that the divine spirit of God the Son was substituted in Christ for a human mind. In other words, when God took human flesh, this is exactly the position of Apollinarius; his battle with the Antiochene school prevented the bishop of Laodicea to allow for any possible duality in the personhood of Christ. If the flesh is dismissed from having a role, it follows that the soul too plays no part in Christ and therefore by extension, to our salvation. In this case the famous dictum of Gregory of Nazianzus holds true: "that which has not been assumed has not been healed."

In the words of Walter Kasper⁽³⁴⁾, Apollinarianism is essentially a Hellenization of the Christian faith where God and man form one living whole in Jesus Christ. God becomes part of the world and a principle within this world whereas the coming of God's reign in Jesus Christ means that both freedom and salvation for mankind is inverted. That is to say, God and man impose limits upon each other and are mutually exclusive. The Church had been influenced by Apollinarianism when it emphasized Christ's divinity to the detriment of his humanity. In the course of time, devotion to the Virgin Mary and saints took on a more prominent role to act as mediators between us and Christ.

The controversy with Apollinarius centers around the interpretation of Lk 1.35, "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you." This verse is employed in J.139 and is used as a rebuttal to Apollinarius' statement, "If the Son of Man is from heaven and Son of God from woman, how can he be both God and man?' I believe that Christ is both man and God...for neither is the divinity earthly nor is humanity divine; rather the power of the Most High comes from above through the Holy Spirit which overshadowed our human nature." As M. Canevet has observed⁽³⁵⁾, it is the notion of power (dunamis) as perceived in Christ's humanity which saves mankind. This commands the vision which Gregory of Nyssa has of the personhood of Jesus Christ. Gregory's chief theme which runs through all his theology is to guard Christ's divine attributes. With this fundamental principle in mind, we can see that for the bishop of Nyssa the notion of becoming is applied not so much to God becoming man but of man becoming God in Christ. This latter principle helps to explain his stress upon the new creation. In a beautiful passage dealing with the Incarnation (J.225-26) based upon Lk 1.35 as stated above, Gregory of Nyssa understands the human nature of Christ in reference to his salvific mission.

The following supplement contains quotations from Against Apollinarius attributed to Apollinarius of Laodicea. The pages refer the critical edition:

-132: Proof of the divine incarnation according to the likeness of man (also cf. 133 & 134).

-134: Only a pious faith is worth practicing, for neither did Eve have the benefit of a faith which has been subject to inquiry. It behooves Christians to be inquisitive and not to imprudently be unmindful of the opinions belonging to either the Greeks or Jews.

-137: The Faithless and heretics claimed that God did not become man and was not subject to human passions. Some heretics appropriate the form of birth from a woman and through sufferings.

-138: To call Christ a divinized man is contrary to apostolic teaching and alien to the synod of bishops. Paul, Photinus, and Marcellus are the authors of this distorted view.

-139: If the Son of man is from heaven and Son of God from woman, how can he be both God and man?

-140: But God took on flesh by the spirit while man took on divinity by the flesh.

-the Word became flesh according to its union with human nature.

-But the flesh is not inanimate, for 'it militates against the Spirit, and its law is at enmity with the law of my mind' [Rom 7.23].

-142: God sent the Lord from heaven.

-143: Since Christ as God has a soul and body along with spirit, that is, mind, one may naturally say that he is a man from heaven.

-145: The second man from heaven is spiritual. This signifies that the man united with God lacks an intelligence of his own.

-146: Paul says that the first Adam has a soul with a body and certainly did not lack such a body; he bestows a name to this unity when he designates the soul as an appropriation of spirit.

-147: The man Christ preexisted not as another Spirit existing apart from him, that is, God; rather, the Lord had the nature of a divine man while remaining a divine Spirit.

-147: The Spirit does not differ from Christ.

-The Lord was divine Spirit in the nature of a divine man.

-155: By them that man by whom God the Father spoke to us had manifested himself, the founder of the ages, the splendor of God's glory, and the stamp of his substance inasmuch as he was God by his own spirit and was not another God, that is, once he cleansed the world from sin through his own flesh.

-158: The prophetic word says that God does not share the same substance as God according to the flesh; rather, he is united to the flesh according to the spirit.

-162: See, Jesus Christ preexisted in his equality with the Father and became like men.

-What can be clearer? Opposites cannot be united, that is, perfect God with perfect man.

-164: But man's body consists of a vile form.

-165: Not a man but as a man, because the noble part is dissimilar to man.

-He humiliated himself according to the flesh, yet God exalted him according to the divine sublimity.

-166: He is glorified as man, but the glory which he possessed before the world was established belongs to God who has eternal existence.

-168: As man he is glorified, rising up from ignominy; as God he possesses glory which existed before the world.

-For the Greeks and Jews are clearly faithless by failing to accept God as born from a woman.

-169: But God had flesh before the ages and was later born of a woman, underwent passions, and by necessity had human nature.

-But the Greeks and Jews will assent to our opinion if we say that a divinized man was born of a woman as in the case of Elias.

-170: Those who do not ascribe to the faith, for example, the birth of God from a woman and his crucifixion by the Jews, are likewise ashamed by such things.

-171-72: God was incarnate from the beginning. He has a visible, palpable body which was born of a woman at the last days. He grew progressively by taking food yet existed before everything and created men along with everything both visible and invisible. He experienced fatigue and felt distress in the face of death.

-172: But he who was crucified was not divine by nature; this did not belong to him, although he is spirit.

-174: If we deny that, we must claim that Christ did not preexist prior to his earthly birth nor existed before all.

-Who is holy from his birth?

-175: Who is wise unless he was taught?

-Who has accomplished the works of God in power?

-176: We distinguish a certain operation according to the flesh which is equal to one according to the spirit.

-He who is equal in power has distinction of operations with regard to the flesh according to which he has vivified not all but those whom he wished.

-177: No one perishes or rises up by reason of his own free will.

-179: But the impious undergo great tribulation.

-It is not recorded that Christ as a man of the earth does not speak this way from his own will as some claim, but as God who descended from heaven.

-180: It is not recorded...(cf. 179).

-182: But the man Christ did not come from the earth as commonly assumed; rather, God descended from heaven and united himself to human nature.

-These words expressing distress do not come from the man whose origin lies in the earth; rather, they come from the God who descended from heaven.

-Christ descended from heaven and united himself to human nature.

-185: But we profess two persons, God and the man which he has assumed. This position is not to be maintained, but to imply that Christ assumed flesh means that he is none other than the incorporeal God. At the same time, Christ resembles us by his life in the flesh.

-Christ is one in the same manner as he is one with us, that is, composed of spirit, soul, and body.

-186: For Christ cannot be made in the likeness of man unless enfleshed according to the human mind.

-187: If the Lord did not have an enfleshed mind, it would consists of wisdom.

-188: The presence of God does not come about through Christ's dwelling with us, but by the birth of a man.

-189: If we believe the Lord to be wisdom, the very one who manifested himself to each person who received grace, we no longer confess the dwelling of God as Christ's presence among us as though wisdom has alienated itself from God.

-190: The enfleshed mind was not the Word but wisdom.

-If mind is not enfleshed it is wisdom.

-If wisdom is not present in the mind, the Lord did not descend, nor did he empty himself.

-Therefore, Christ was a man, for according to Paul, man is an enfleshed mind.

-191: The man has his origin both from earth and from heaven.

-If the mind is with God, then the human mind was in Christ.

-192: If the mind is with God and the human mind was in Christ, then the incarnation did not occur. If this is true with respect to Christ's self-determination and uncoerced mind, any deed brought to completion in the flesh, namely, the abolition of sin, comes from another self-determined movement and the divine mind. Our own self-determined freedom partakes of this abolition inasmuch as it unites itself to Christ.

-The mind is self-determined yet is moved by an external force; the flesh completes its work by the abolition of sin.

-If anything great acquires further addition, it is done by exertion, while no such exertion is present in Christ who lacks a human mind.

-193: The human race is not saved by the assumption of mind and the whole man but by the taking up of the flesh.

-194: If the perfect God were united to perfect man, they would be two.

-195: The human race and the entire man is not saved by the assumption of mind but by assuming flesh, its natural governing principle. The immutable mind does not require submission to the flesh by any defect of knowledge; rather ,it unites the flesh to itself without coercion.

-199: But the divinity attracts the flesh without coercion.

-Pure virtue shares in everything subject to the mind.

-Persons resembling Christ with respect to the mind are not dissimilar to him according to the flesh.

-If God had united himself to man, he is perfect with that which is perfect, for the are two; one is Son of God by nature and the other is son of God by adoption.

-201: The four names of the Trinity present no danger for us; we should not subject angels as slaves to men.

-202: If the true God has received God, then there are many gods since this multitude receives God.

-204: Nothing can be united to God, for example, the flesh which was assumed.

-Nothing can be adored, for example, the flesh of Christ.

-The flesh of the Lord is to be adored inasmuch there is one person and one living being with him.

-205 & 206: Nothing created is to be adored as belonging to the Lord, for example, his flesh.

-206: If anyone things that a man, rather than all men and angels, is bound with God.

-207: Angels and men are devoid of free will since flesh lacks this capacity. Rather, corruption of our innate free will is not free will, for nature cannot be corrupted by its Maker. Hence, man is not united to God.

-208: The corruption of our innate free will means that we are deprived of it.

-209: Man consists of three parts, spirit, soul, and body.

-If man consists of these three elements, the Lord is a man. Therefore, the Lord consists of three elements, spirit, soul, and body.

-213: But man consists of three parts, spirit, soul, and body.

-But the heavenly man is a vivifying spirit.

-If the heavenly man has every aspect of the earthly man, the Spirit also shares these earthy characteristics and is not of heaven but is a receptacle of the heavenly God.

-214: If man has no mind, he is heavenly; if he is whole, he is no longer heavenly but a receptacle of the heavenly God.

-If man is a receptacle of the heavenly God, it is from the God in heaven above, as Ecclesiastes says.

-If we consist of three parts, Christ, who consists of four parts, is not a man but Man-God.

-216: If something consists of two perfect elements, God neither has what man is, nor does man have what God is.

-217: Man himself cannot save the world, for he is subject to corruption, the common lot of humanity.

-God does not save us unless we are joined to him.

-Having become flesh, that is man, Christ is united with us when as the Gospel says, he became flesh and dwelt with us.

-218: But no one can destroy sin unless he was made a sinless man; neither can he destroy the reign of death in all men unless he died and rose as a man.

-The death of man does not destroy death itself.

-219: Neither the death of a man destroys death nor the resurrection of him who had died. It is clear that the God of all creation had died, because it was impossible for Christ to be restrained by death's bonds.

-We claim that Christ as God the Word did not exist from the beginning.

-227: How can God be man and not lack his identity as God if he had the mind of a man?

-The divine nature became a human mind.

-228: If God existed after the resurrection and was no longer man, how could the Son of Man send his angels? How can we see the Son of Man coming on the clouds? How can he preexist with God and be deified as when he said, 'I and the Father are one?'

-230: But he who held converse with men through the flesh said, 'I and the Father are one.'

-231: The savior has suffered hunger, thirst, labor, grief, and sorrow.

-...not two persons as though one were God and the other man. Therefore, God has suffered and he who is incapable of suffering suffers not under the constraint of an unwilling nature as man but in accord with nature.

-232: The passions must be stirred according to the likeness of men.

-The body existing in heaven is with us until the consummation of the ages.

-233: The Lord is inappropriately divided into what is subject to contradiction, that is, he is incorporeal to corporeal beings and is in the body to those who are incorporeal, for in heaven he consecrates the flesh by spiritually uniting it in himself.

A note about the translation: Within the text are the letters "J" and "M." "J" refers to the critical edition of the Greek text begun under the direction of Werner Jaeger. The Treatise Against Apollinarius was edited by Friedrich Mueller and may be found in Gregorii Nysseni Opera, vol.iii (Leiden 1958), p.131-233. The letter "M" refers to Migne's edition. PG#45.1124-1269 (Paris, 1858).

The Text

[M.1124 & J.131] An appropriate way of beginning our treatise is to quote our Lord who bids us to "beware of false prophets who come to you in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravenous wolves. By their fruits you will know them" (Mt.7.15-16). If fruit can discern the true sheep from the rapacious one which surreptitiously creeps into the company of the flock disguised in our human form, it can reveal the enemy hidden among us. We must therefore discern the good fruit from the bad in order to expose the [enemy's] deception. As the text says, "By their fruit you shall know them." In my judgment, the good fruit of any teaching augments the Church with persons who have been saved while more pernicious, harmful individuals belong with those headed for destruction. If a person increases his flock through preaching [M.1125], extends to everyone the vine growing on the sides of his house [Ps.127.3], plants cultivated olives around the Lord's table which were once wild, places mystic branches into the sweet, flowing streams of doctrine which increase the flocks and diminishes Laban's possession while Jacob's abounds with [J.132] superior offspring [Gen 30.38], should this person manifest the fruit of his own teaching, (such fruit, as it is said, is growth in the truth), indeed he is a prophet who exercises interpretation by God's spirit. But if anyone plucks the vine's twigs, he uproots the plant around the divine table, brings it to desolation and withholds spiritual waters so that the sheep cannot conceive [by eating] the patriarch's tender green branches and abound with superior offspring. Instead, the sheep stray from nourishing pastures, that is, from the traditions of the fathers, lodge outside the fold, and are dispersed throughout alien pastures. When the fruit of such a teaching brings about this situation, the form of a wolf now hiding under a sheep's skin will show itself.

Let us now examine the teachings of Apollinarius of Syria, to see whether they increase or decrease the flock, gather the dispersed or scatter those who have been gathered, and whether or not they support or manifest hostility towards the teachings of the fathers. If [Apollinarius] in his enthusiasm has something better in mind, he is indeed a sheep, not a wolf. However, the Lord tells us, "beware of false prophets." This warning is intended to make us watchful for any slanderous, destructive mouth which approaches with the teeth of novel doctrines to lacerate God's holy body, the Church. That our words do not appear hostile, we now present the teaching [of Apollinarius] whose inscription reads, "Proof of the divine incarnation according to the likeness of man." Perhaps a correct understanding of this inscription may dispense the need to disprove the absurdity of [Apollinarius'] teaching.

[J.133] [The inscription to Apollinarius' treatise] reads, "the proof of the divine incarnation according to the likeness of man." We should summon divine scripture to rebuke the coinage of this new expression: "The word became flesh" (Jn.1.14), "his glory has dwelt in our land" (Ps.84.10) and "God has become manifest in the flesh" (1Tim.3.16). Each verse [M.1128] informs us of the divinity whose substance remains unchangeable, immutable amid change and unalterable that [God] might cure in his own immutable nature our inclination towards evil. And so [Apollinarius] states that God did not appear in the flesh, that is, the Word did not become flesh, the very One who was in the likeness of man and who shared the same pattern of our human life by assuming a slave's form. Instead he maintains that the Word impressed itself upon some form of divine flesh. I do not know what [Apollinarius] means here. Either the divinity is mutable and changes into the dense nature of flesh from its simple, uncompounded nature or the divine substance, while remaining itself, appears as another divine incarnation within the confinements of the human and divine natures. The result is neither man nor God but something which participates in both. Such an incarnation is connatural with our humanity, yet the divinity is certainly more noble than this humanity. But this cannot be God, for the divinity is simple and uncomposite by nature; when simplicity is absent, the divinity is likewise absent. Yet man is not something contrary to this, for he is composed of a body and a rational soul. If we cannot understand these two components, then how can we use the name "man?" When speaking of man's body and soul, we consider each part respectively. The combination of these two elements constitute what we call a man. If the divine [J.134] incarnation yields neither man nor God, something which the author [Apollinarius] has devised in his inscription, we are unable to locate it.

"A proof of the divine incarnation according to the likeness of man." What does this phrase mean, "according to the likeness of man?" That the divine Incarnation is in accord with human nature. When does this come about? On the last day? And what about the mystery of [Mary's] virginity? The Lord does not assume flesh according to man's likeness as our author would like; rather, the divine power and the Holy Spirit effects this in accord with the Gospel [Lk. 1.26f]. Does the Incarnation occur before the ages? How can being be compared to non-being? Man is situated is at the end of all creation while the Lord is king before the ages. If he existed before all ages, to whose human image was the divine incarnation made? Adam's? He did not yet exist. To the likeness of another man? What is this man fashioned before Adam to whom the divine incarnation is compared? For that [M.1129] is indeed similar to being but dissimilar to non-being. And so two absurdities appear in Apollinarius' doctrine: either some created thing is older than its Maker or the divinity which became incarnate is compared to non-being. The divinity was in the beginning, not Adam. If the divine nature became incarnate according to man's likeness, it is compared to something which lacks being; however, that which is compared to non-being would be composed of nothing at all. But [Apollinarius] says that the Incarnation occurs in a manner different from the human one. And what is that likeness composed of two different natures? If [Apollinarius] denies the divine Incarnation according to man as existing before the ages as well as at the end of time, that is, our Lord's dispensation for mankind when God manifested himself [J.135] in the flesh, the Incarnation is according to the likeness of man (We cannot maintain this position regarding the mystery of [Mary's] virginity). Both notions as expressed in the inscription to the treatise would be invalid. Because his inscription is ill-conceived and unsatisfactory, I believe that we can adequately clarify this fact by his words, provided we understand them carefully.

It is now time to clarify by close examination the subject of this inscription. I will briefly paraphrase the opening words of [Apollinarius'] treatise, paying attention to their meaning while omitting any point that may be innocuous or not worth exploring. "Only a pious faith is worth practicing, for Eve lacked the benefit of a faith not subject to inquiry. It behooves Christians to be inquisitive and not to be imprudently unmindful of the opinions which belong to the Greeks and Jews." These sentiments are expressed in many places of the treatise's opening words: "Both the faithless and heretics claimed that God neither become man nor was subject to human passions. Some heretics appropriate the form of our faith by claiming that Christ assumed a divinized man through a birth from a woman and through sufferings." [Apollinarius] was indeed familiar with certain heresies which claimed that Christ was a divinized man and may have known their source. For our part, we have travelled widely and have met persons who share teachings in common with ours and who confess their faith when confronted with individuals who disagree and inquire about the Word [of God]. We have not yet heard from [Apollinarius] who makes inflammatory statements about the mystery [of faith], namely, that Christ was [M.1132] a divinized man. Therefore, we ought to correct the [J.136] false opinions of his teachings, introducing in their place notions more amenable to the faith. In this way, one may refrain from devising non-existent teachings and to resist anything insubstantial; however, a person should defend himself with appropriate responses against reprisals. Skilled physicians do not apply their art to non-existing ailments but their knowledge serves to heal persons who are already sick. Let it be known that God did not appear in the flesh but that Christ was a divinized man; then we will find some value in his tract. However, once we discover the extent of his illness, it would be useless to ascribe to all his insubstantial teachings and become involved with such errors.

[Apollinarius], however, did not rashly insert this necessity into his writings; in order to provide a certain system and order to his teaching, he added as already said something which was not uttered. In this way, he appears to combat errors though a fraudulent refutation that God is mortal. His treatise as a whole claims that the Only-Begotten Son's divinity is mortal and that passion has no place in his humanity; rather, his impassible, immutable nature is subject to change and passion. Hence, [Apollinarius'] treatise has a certain value for persons with an esoteric knowledge of mysteries. However, the sequence of his words is received by persons who are still infants, for even the irreligious Greeks do not ascribe to them. For if the divinity of the Only Begotten [Son] has perished, life, truth, righteousness, goodness, light, and power must have perished along with it. All these diverse interpretations are offered about the Only-Begotten's divinity.

Since [Christ] is simple, undivided, and uncompounded [J.137], he is said to be whole and not composed of parts. It follows that if one part exists [in Christ], all others exist in him, and if one does not exist, all are naturally excluded. Therefore, if the divinity has perished, all his other characteristics which compose his divinity have also expired. However, not only is Christ power but he is the power and wisdom of God. Because these attributes have passed away with the Son's divinity, the wisdom of God does not belong to the Father; neither does power, life, nor can anything else be named after the good [God]. For all these attributes belong to God, and we believe that everything pertaining to the Father also belongs to the Son; what belongs to the Son does not lack existence because we confess that all things [M.1133] belong equally to the Father and the Son. If power has perished and, Christ is the power of God, has not that power which has been destroyed now restored and become something different? For the Father's power is present in the Son, a teaching our opponents confess. If the one power has been conquered by death and passed into oblivion at the time of [the Son's] passion, what other power does [Apollinarius] manufacture which he summons from death? If he claims that this power has died while another remains immortal, no longer is the power acknowledged as belonging to the Son of the Father. As a consequence, our Lord's words which confess that everything belonging to the Son also belongs to the Father are scorned as no longer true. For [the Son] who possesses all things belonging to the Father certainly has the Father's immortality; immortality has nothing at all in common with death. If the Son's divinity is supposed to be mortal [J.138], they [the followers of Apollinarius] construct the notion that the Father himself lacks immortality. But [Christ] said that he has the Father in himself. And so, anyone attempting to demonstrate the mortality [of the Son] to whom belongs the Father's eternity is a liar. Since our religion maintains that the power belongs both to Father and Son (We see the Son in the Father and the Father in the Son), then anything passible clearly suffers death while that which is free from passion effects impassibility in what is passible.

But let us move on to the next part of [Apollinarius'] teaching. I will again briefly refer to his words to understand his intention: "To call Christ a divinized man is contrary to apostolic teaching and alien to the synod [of bishops]. Paul, Photinus, and Marcellus are the authors of this distorted view." Next we have an example of athletes violently engaged in a dispute and who resort to murderous words: "How can you say that the man from the earth whom [scripture] claims descended from heaven is called Son of man?" These words serve to confirm what was just said and serve as an introduction to further inappropriate remarks. In order to show that God has died, [Apollinarius] concedes that we cannot attribute an earthly nature to [Christ] since suffering which belongs entirely to death [M.1136] has an affinity with the earth. "The man who descended from heaven is not the man from the earth. Nevertheless, if man has descended from heaven, the Lord did not deny this fact in the Gospels." How is this statement consonant with [Apollinarius'] other remarks? If man is not from the earth but has descended from heaven to us, [J.139] how can it be said that the Son of Man has descended from heaven? [Apollinarius] concedes this, for just as we maintain that fathers exist before their sons on earth, so the heavenly man enters [the earthly] man. Since [Christ] is regarded as the Son of Man, he unhesitatingly accepts a name from his father, but humanly speaking, we maintain that another father exists first in heaven. If one attests to the words, "No one has ascended to heaven except the Son of Man who has descended from heaven" [Jn.3.13] and disassociates them from the earthly man by saying that the Son of Man has come to us from heaven, [Apollinarius] attributes another man in heaven, the Father. [Christ] descended from him to us so that the life of heaven might signify such things as nations, peoples, lands, and so forth. If the one who came from heaven is the Son of Man born from Mary of the seed of David according to the flesh and named Son of Man despite his heavenly birth, he is falsely called Son of God since he lacks fellowship with God with respect to heaven and earth. The following words sum up [Apollinarius'] teaching: "If the Son of Man is from heaven and Son of God from woman, how can he be both God and man?" I believe that [Christ] is both man and God, a statement complying with faith's correct interpretation and not with [Apollinarius'] inscription. For neither is the divinity earthly nor is humanity divine as he maintains; rather, the power of the Most High comes from above through the Holy Spirit [Lk 1.35] which overshadowed our human nature, that is, this power took on form, the spotless Virgin nourished it in human flesh, and he who was born from her was named Son of the Most High. The divine [J.140] power which has its origin with the Most High thus assumed fellowship with mankind.

"But God," says [Apollinarius], "took on flesh by the spirit while man took on divinity by the flesh." Once again, what is the incarnation of the spirit except union with our flesh? And what is the origin of man except the first man who came from the earth and whose descent does not come from heaven as Moses has taught us? "God took dust from the earth and fashioned man [Gen 2.7]." However, we are instructed about another [M.1137] constitution of man from heaven of whom we have been ignorant. With respect to this statement we have, "The mystery became manifested in the flesh [1Tim 3.16]." This agrees with our teaching and "the Word became flesh according to its union [with human nature]." These words are accurately stated, for [Apollinarius] who says that the Word was united to the flesh asserts no more than the union of two [natures]. "But," he says, "the flesh is not inanimate for 'it militates against the Spirit, and its law is at enmity with the law of my mind [Rom 7.23].'" What an excellent statement! God does not fashion the flesh without a soul. Therefore, let us inquire whether the flesh assumed by the Word of God is animate as the inscription says. We maintain that the soul is animate and the body is in common with the animals. He who attributes to the Word this animated human flesh unites to it another whole man. Nothing can be more appropriate to the human soul than an intellectual nature which enables us to fully share the lot of irrational animals: concupiscence, anger, appetite for food, capacity for growth, satiety, sleep, digestion, [J.141] change, excrement and capacities rooted in the soul which belong both to us and irrational beasts. [Apollinarius] therefore says that he who has assumed man concedes that he has nothing other than a rational soul and testifies to his intellect which is his own human soul. Of this the Apostle says, "The wisdom of the flesh is at enmity with God" [Rom 8.7] (for the flesh is not subject to God's law). He is speaking here of a person's capacity for free will which belongs to the intellect. For to chose either in a spirit of obedience or inflexibility with respect to the law rests with free choice which cannot be divorced from our intellectual faculty. This faculty belongs to the mind and is not found among infants. How can a person who opposes free will and reduces it to servility lack a mind? For our free will does not choose petty, evil things as demonstrated by persons who lack a mind; rather, those person who lack a good mind follow its lead. Divinely inspired scripture teaches us about that serpent, the originator and inventor of evil [Gen 3.1]. The serpent certainly does not lack reason, but is more prudent than all the other beasts.

Thus we have added our own words to those of [Apollinarius] to refute the insolence of his teaching. The Apostle [Paul] does not simply oppose the flesh with the spirit by speaking of a choice for evil with respect to a [M.1140] more becoming manner of life; rather, he rebukes the Corinthians for succumbing to passion: "You are carnal" [1Cor 3.3]. When the Apostle had spoken to the Corinthians, did Apollinarius' triple division of man's intellect exist? Or does Paul call such people carnal [J.142] because they behave immoderately due to an inordinate inclination to the flesh? He advises the following: "While there is jealousy and strife among you, are you not of the flesh" [1Cor 3.3]? Jealousy and strife are works of the mind. [Apollinarius'] words abundantly show that man consists of three parts, flesh, soul and mind, a teaching not distant from ours. This three-fold division claims that man is composed of a rational soul and body while the mind is numbered separately, a view which allows for many heretical interpretations. If the rational capacity is counted by itself, another part may be termed irrational by some persons and concupiscible by others. Similarly, any other movements of the soul may be enumerated due to their wide variety instead of employing man's triple division.

But let us move on in order not to unduly prolong our refutation. Man has a triple nature or three parts or whatever else we may wish to designate his composition as stated by several synodal definitions issued against Paul of Samosata. For example, "God sent the Lord [Christ] from heaven." Again, the definition of faith promulgated at Nikaea is related to what was just said: "He who descended from heaven became flesh and was made man." These words prepare us for what [Apollinarius] is about to say, thereby revealing his position on the matter. As if to accommodate himself to what has been demonstrated he says, [J.143] "Since Christ as God has a soul and body along with spirit, that is the mind, one may reasonably say that he is a man from heaven." What do these words have in common with the preceding ones? Why [M.1141] did this synod issue a promulgation against [Paul of] Samosata? But let us overlook our earlier teachings and see what Nikaea had taught. The faith which claims that [Christ] descended from heaven and took flesh implies that the flesh did not exist before his descent but came into existence later when he became enfleshed and incarnate. All the Churches proclaim this teaching, including ourselves, for it is common inheritance of the Church. Where, then, does [Nikaea] say that Christ possesses the spirit or mind of God with his soul and body as a man from heaven? We cannot discover this intent whether in the words themselves or in the sense of the text. The words [of the synod] differ greatly from those of [Apollinarius] as much as the psalmist's words when he says that the east differs from the west [Ps 102.12]. What does [Apollinarius] have in common with the synod? He says that Christ was incarnate in human flesh while possessing the divine spirit or mind. By claiming Christ to be a divine man, one does not say that he has God in himself as though something were added to another. The synod stated that [Christ] descended from heaven, so let his descent to us remain untainted. We agree with this assumption if we discover a loftier meaning and do not admit that the divinity which is everywhere and embraces everything has descended to a given place; rather, we maintain that [Christ] descended to our lowly human nature. But the synod adds the following words for anyone who wishes to accept this descent: [J.144] "he became incarnate." How should a birth from woman be interpreted favorably? For God is not born from woman as he is in himself; he exists before creation and did not come into being through a fleshly birth. Instead, the Holy Spirit prepared an entry and certainly lacked no material resources to make a fitting dwelling. "[Wisdom] built a house for herself" [Prov 9.1] by forming earth into a man from the Virgin through which he became united with humanity.

Where do these words [of the synod] concur with Apollinarius' claim that Christ as God has spirit or mind together with a soul and body [M.1144] as a man from heaven? If it were possible to apply divine eloquence to visible reality, to interpret dreams in accordance with our desires and to harmonize them with scripture, then one should go ahead and apply these ideas. If the Apostle advises us to shy away from godless, silly myths [1Tm 4.7], he forbids us to associate with anything which is irreconcilable with [scripture]. But we should combat with our own word the ideas which [Apollinarius] insists upon in order to discredit his teaching. He claims that Paul calls the first Adam a soul with a body [1Cor 15.45] and eloquently uses words which are true. And so, was the first man of whom Paul spoke as a living soul something created and irrational? But history bears witness to a significant work of grace regarding the intellect: God brought all living things to man [J.145] whom he designated as a lord to bestow names and to consider appropriate names for each of them [Gen 2.19]. But disobedience, the inclination toward unlawful things, and shame from wicked deeds, provided an excuse for accusations and activities to demonstrate the faculty of our mind. Why, then, is Paul silent about Adam's intellectual faculty? It is clear that the rest [of our human nature] is joined to it as in the expression, "To you all flesh will come" [Ps 64.3]. Here David speaks of the entire human race by employing the term "flesh." Also, Jacob sojourned in Egypt with seventy-five persons whom history says neither lacked minds nor flesh at that specific time [Gen 46.26-27].

But [Apollinarius] says, "the second man from heaven is spiritual. This signifies that the man united with God lacks an intelligence of his own." We should be able to refute this strange doctrine without much difficulty. [Paul's] words, "as is the man of heaven so are those who are of heaven" [1Cor 15.48], differ considerably with such a notion. Persons who believe their origin lies in heaven call themselves heavenly. As Paul says, they have migrated to the heavenly way of life [Phil 3.20] and resemble the heavenly [Christ]; indeed, no one who has embraced the faith lacks reason. This comparison shows a necessary bond between [Christ] and men by virtue of his human mind: "as is the man of heaven so are those who are of heaven." But we confess that he was either fully invested with a human mind or lacked it completely. Just as we see the attributes of an earthly man [M.1145] at work in his offspring, so the Apostle says [Heb 4.15] in reference to life's necessities that [Christ] was tempted in all things and resembled us [J.146] except by sin [1Cor 15.45]. The mind does not consist of sin yet [Christ] must share every aspect of our human nature. The Apostle correctly speaks of him in our human nature if we confess him to be made like us. In this way, he who shared this nature might fashion us into what he himself is.

Let us once again recall the words of [Apollinarius]: "Paul says that the first Adam has a soul with a body and certainly did not lack such a body; he bestows a name to this unity when he designates the soul as a appropriation of spirit." Here [Apollinarius] admits to three parts according to an appropriation of the soul as the body and spirit enfolded in [Christ]. However, Paul says, "the last [Adam] became a life-giving spirit" [1Cor 15.45]. Paul shows that the name [Adam] has special meaning with reference to [Christ's] other appellations and is of equal significance. If Adam is called a soul due to his sin, the man [Christ] united with God is called a full spirit since "he did not sin nor was treachery found in his mouth" [Is 53.9]. But [Apollinarius] rejects this. He says that [Christ] was of the earth and was fashioned from it because his soul which had been formed from this earth received life. Does he not call the mind spirit when united to the form belonging to Adam? Does this consist in likeness to God? What emanation came from God unless it were this mind? [Apollinarius] claims that this man is from heaven because the heavenly spirit took on flesh. Where does scripture [J.147] speak of such a thing? Which author of the sacred text says that spirit became incarnate? Neither the Gospel nor the great Apostle [Paul] has taught us such a thing. Instead, the Gospel proclaims "the Word became flesh" [Jn 1.14] and the Spirit descended in the form of a dove [Mt 3.16]. Nothing is said here of the Spirit becoming incarnate with regard to the mystery of our faith. "His glory has dwelt in our land" [Ps 84.10]. "Truth has sprung from the earth" [Ps 84.12]. "God has manifested himself in flesh" [1Tm 3.126]. "Righteousness has looked down from heaven" [Ps 84.12]. These and other examples show that the divinely inspired scripture does not mention the Spirit's incarnation.

"The man Christ preexisted," says [Apollinarius], "not as another Spirit existing apart from him, that is, God; rather, the Lord had the nature of a divine man while remaining a divine Spirit." Such are [M.1148] the words of his inscription. Since a full understanding of his position is not entirely clear due to a certain weakness, I will first reveal the obscurity of his words and proceed to their examination. "The man Christ preexisted." [Apollinarius] maintains that the Word who existed in the beginning and the man who appeared in time existed before his manifestation. This position is more clearly brought out as follows: "The Spirit does not differ from [Christ]." He adds that the Son's divinity is human from the beginning, a position which becomes clearer by the following: "The Lord was divine Spirit in the nature of a divine man." For him, [Christ] constituted one nature, God and man, and coalesced together. [J.148] [Apollinarius] is convinced that [Christ] became manifest through flesh from the Virgin not only according to the eternity of his divinity as we believe, but also according to his flesh which had preexisted creation.

Shortly thereafter [Apollinarius] attaches his own opinion to the testimony, "Before Abraham was, I am" [Jn 8.58]. And John the Baptist says, "He existed before me" [Jn 1.15]. The Apostle says, "There is one Lord through whom came all things" [Col 1.17]. We omit the words of Zachariah [13.7] which strengthen his distorted view [cf. J.154]. If allow the breadth of thought contained in this strange teaching to pass by unnoticed, I certainly would have refuted its hidden contents. But since [Apollinarius'] impiety cries out with an especially loud voice, I do not know what more our words can accomplish. If flesh existed before the ages and if Abraham existed before the Virgin, then Mary preceded Nachor [Gen 11.22]. As a result, Mary preceded Adam. What am I saying here? That [Mary] seems older than creation and more ancient than the ages. For if [Christ] became incarnate through the Virgin, Jesus is flesh; however, the Apostle testifies that he existed before all creation. Also, [Apollinarius] seems to say that Mary is co-eternal with the Father. Nevertheless, I keep my silence with regard to these inappropriate matters which his novel teaching expounds, for wise persons may freely examine this strange doctrine as long as we do not clarify its unsuitable nature.

[M.1149] Let us skip over the foul odor of these thoughts. Nevertheless, we should observe that if the flesh existed before the ages, the divinity is not rendered void, the Son did not exist in the form of God and he did not assume the form of a servant. However, [J.149] the [divinity] which now appeared while retaining its own nature was not subject to humiliation. Would that the Word [of God] condescend to be present in my words, however, I remain silent with regard to the rest [of Apollinarius' teaching]. If the flesh existed before all creation, then all things have their root in weakness, not in power. "The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak" [Mt 26.41]. If [Apollinarius' teaching] seems peculiar, who could not but recognize its repercussions and what flows from it? He attributes all the flesh's contingencies to [Christ] who existed in the flesh before the creation of the ages such as labor, grief, tears, thirst, sleep, hunger and other attributes which are even more contrary to his nature.

Since "a child is born for us," as the divine scripture says [Is 9.5], and the shepherds saw the Lord wrapped in swaddling clothes, and as Luke says [2.12], "Jesus advanced in age, wisdom, and grace" until he attained manhood through various stages of growth, what do [the followers of Apollinarius] say about the flesh which existed before the ages? What kind of body did he have then because he had passed through every stage of growth proper to human life? Was that [preexisting] man who was older than all creation a boy, a new-born babe, an adolescent or a fully matured adult? But if they claim a child, how can they say that he failed to attain maturity with the passage of so many stages of life? If they [the followers of Apollinarius] say a perfect man, a notion they feel we should confess, how does an infant's body contain him by human generation? What about the rest of the human body? How can the body's mass circumscribe him? How does the body's mass attain its own measure? Did [Christ] possess a body from the beginning and grow in stages or [J.150] did he join something else to himself through nourishment? But if they say that [Christ] has a beginning, nourishment is useless. If they admit that the Lord does not partakes of food, what about the flesh left behind in heaven? Most likely it seems that [Christ] left a great part of it behind yet kept only what the Virgin's womb could contain. Those who indulge in opinions such as these and who invent other teachings, by necessity end up by maintaining an absurd position.

[M.1152] But let us pass over these matters, for it would not be illogical to inquire about that divine incarnation which occurred before the ages. If they maintain that the flesh always existed along with [Christ], then God is flesh. However, all flesh corresponds to what we can lay hold of, that is, its nature is material and composite, for anything of this sort necessarily corresponds to matter and is subject to natural dissolution. We know that [Christ] partook of human life in a human manner because through flesh, bone and blood like other men, and he shed blood by being pierced with nails and a lance. The Lord therefore said to those who did not believe his appearance, "Handle me and see and know that a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have" [Lk 24.39]. Therefore, if the divine incarnation, as Apollinarius [J.151] says, does not commence from the Virgin but existed before Abraham and all creation, the disciples' vision consisted of a physical entity with flesh and bones. Thus [Christ's] human composition always existed and his descent had no share in our humble condition; rather, [Christ's] divine nature remained hidden and was manifested at the time of his incarnation. What did Arius and the even more impious Eunomius think about disgracing the Only Begotten's glory, something which Apollinarius had accomplished in his own tract? God, who existed before the ages, consisted of bones, hair, skin, nerves, flesh and fat; he was composed of various other elements, lacked simplicity and was complex. All such characteristics are attributed to "the Word was in the beginning and was with God, and was God" [Jn 1.1]. By sharing our humble nature, he took flesh in the last days out of love for us and united himself to man. Having fully assumed our nature in order to deify humanity by union with his divinity, he sanctified the entire mass of our human nature by that first fruits.

But I think we should quickly pass through each point of sacred scripture which [Apollinarius] has misinterpreted, for it would be superfluous to examine at length [M.1153] every aspect of his teaching. We summon the Apostle as a witness to demonstrate that the [Word] lacked from flesh and blood from all eternity who said that [Christ] redeemed us through his blood and took away our sins through his flesh [Eph 1.7]. In my opinion, anyone who looks elsewhere is not in his right mind. Who does not know that divine mystery when [J.152] the Founder of our salvation pursued the lost sheep as a shepherd [Lk 15.5, Mt 18.12]? We are that sheep who have strayed through sin from the flock of the one hundred rational sheep. [Christ] laid the entire sheep on his own shoulders; not just one sheep had strayed but since all have strayed, he gathers them all together. He does not carry the skin nor leave behind the innards as Apollinarius would like it. Having placed the sheep on his shoulders, it becomes one with him by partaking his divinity. [Christ] therefore placed the sheep on his shoulders because in his desire to seek and save the lost, he had found it. This sheep which had once erred did not walk on its own feet; instead, God bears it. And because what appeared as a sheep, that is man, [God's] footsteps were unknown as scripture says [Ps 76.20]. He who bears the sheep upon himself bears no trace of sin nor going astray; God's footprint is impressed upon him throughout his life's journey which appears as teachings, cures, raising the dead and other such marvels. Once the pastor took the sheep upon himself, he becomes one with it and speaks with the voice of the sheep to his flock. How does our human weakness hear the divine voice? In a human fashion, that is to say, in the manner of sheep he says to us, "My sheep hear my voice" [Jn 10.16]. And so, the pastor who has taken upon himself the sheep speaks our language and is both sheep and shepherd. He assumed the sheep in his own person, and what he had assumed is a pastor.

Because a good shepherd gives his life for his sheep [Jn 10.27] to abolish death [J.153] by his own death, he becomes the author of our salvation by his human nature as well as priest and lamb by assuming the effects of human passion which is death. Since death is the dissolution of body and soul, he who unites both to himself, I mean body and soul, does not separate them ("For the gifts [M.1156] of God are without repentance," says the Apostle, Rom 11.29). But having imparted himself to us by his own body and soul, [Christ] opened paradise for the thief [Lk 23.43] when he destroyed the power of corruption. And [God's] life-giving power renders the destruction of death, corruption, powerless because his bounty and grace share in our human nature. Thus he who shares both parts [body and soul] unites through his resurrection that which has been dispersed; by his own power he delivers his own body for internment in the heart of the earth [Ps 12.40]. As it is written, he can separate himself from his soul when he says to the Father, "Into your hands I commend my spirit" [Lk 23.46], and when he said to the thief, "Today you will be with me in paradise" [Lk 23.43]. Both statements express the truth.

In another passage we read of the divine way of life which is paradise located in the Father's spacious hand. As the prophet, the Lord's mouthpiece, says with reference to the heavenly Jerusalem, "I have graven you on the palms of my hands; your walls are continually before me" [Is 49.16]. Therefore death is conquered and has lost its domination. That which is composite is divided, and that which is not composite is immune to dissolution. The nature of that which is not composite abides in what is composite, [M.154] and the soul which has been separated from the body no longer suffers separation. As it is said, the sign and effect of this is the body's incorruptibility and the soul's existence in paradise. Such a simple, uncomposite form of life suffers no division; however, that which is divided is united to that which cannot be divided. As [Paul] says, "God raised him from the dead" [Col 2.12]. Since another power did not restored Lazarus [Jn 11.43] nor anyone else to life, the same applies to the Lord's resurrection. In the case of the Only Begotten, God resurrected man to union with him after the separation of body and soul and their subsequent union, resulting in total salvation for [human] nature. Hence [Christ] is called Originator of our life. For the Only Begotten [Son] who died and rose for us [2Cor 5.19] reconciled the world to himself and purchased us, having redeemed us by his own body and blood by partaking of our human nature. The Apostle says that [Christ] ransomed us through his own blood and blotted out our sins by his own flesh [Eph 1.7]. Such is our understanding of the Apostle's words in contrast to Apollinarius. Let a person carefully judge and weigh [M.1157] which opinion deserves more reverence: whether ours which says that the [divine] glory dwelt in our land out of love for us, or [Apollinarius] who says that the flesh belonging to God was not newly acquired out of his bounty but was consubstantial and connatural.

If the prophet Zachariah has anything further to say which he uttered [J.155] in mystery, I think it is not worth examining whether it pertains to the Lord or to something else. He says, "Awake, O sword, against my shepherds and against the man who is my citizen" [Zach 13.7]. We deem it arrogant to unjustly brandish words as a sword against a person of one's own race. Apollinarius says that he raises a sword against the Lord by the title "shepherd." He does not know that in many places scripture calls pastors and shepherds persons who are endowed with authority. Again, he neglects the Letter to the Hebrews on this point which clearly speaks of the impropriety of such thoughts a cursory reading of the text reveals. Because Hebrews says that in these our last days God spoke through his Son in many and varied ways after he had first spoken to our fathers through the prophets [Heb 1.1], [Apollinarius] clearly says that God appeared to us. However, he interprets the Apostle's words by saying, "By them that man by whom God the Father spoke to us had manifested himself, the founder of the ages, the splendor of [God's] glory, and the stamp of his substance inasmuch as he was God by his own spirit and was not another God, that is, once he cleansed the world from sin through his own flesh."

Apollinarius makes no attempt to alter his words in response to our position. If a man, as his teaching claims, has made the ages and if his flesh is the splendor [of God] and the form of a servant imprints itself upon God's substance, I no longer feel that we should oppose this teaching; rather, we should mourn the stupidity of those persons [J.156] who give allegiance to such novel teachings. [Apollinarius] speaks of man in a merely human way, that is, as someone who spits and makes clay in his hand, who puts his fingers into a deaf person's ears, who touches the diseased and dead, takes sleep and rest from labor, cries, is afflicted by sadness and grief, and who is both hungry and thirsty. Is this the man's [Christ] corporeality and humanity whom [Apollinarius] maintains existed before creation and is God in the nature of composite, solid, and dense flesh? Let all pious ears be blocked in order [M.1160] that flesh's passions which insult the divinity with human attributes may not defile the divine, incorrupt precepts. For who does not know that God appeared to us in the flesh? According to pious tradition he is incorporeal, invisible, uncomposite, both was and is boundless and uncircumscribed, is present everywhere, penetrates all creation and has manifested himself in our human condition. Since every visible body by necessity is circumscribed, any manifestation is subject to limitation and is bound by space, for such limitations cannot share [God's] unbounded nature. But the prophet says, "His greatness has no end" [Ps 144.3]. If the divine nature is flesh as [Apollinarius] claims, and if his manifestation is subject to limitations, how can God's greatness, as the prophet says, have no limit? How can we recognize what is infinite by finite reality and what is uncircumscribed by limitation? Rather, as we [J.157] have said, how can strength come from death? If a man is creator of the ages and remains the same, that is, flesh, as Apollinarius interprets it, man has created everything. But divine scripture speaks of the flesh's weakness which does not partake of strength, fortitude, power or any other lofty notions befitting God which [Apollinarius] attributes to him.

Although [Apollinarius'] position is not entirely irreverent, his treatise continues to utter further blasphemous remarks against the Father. He says that man is the splendor of God's glory and his egotistic notions has remodelled God into the form of an idol with a corporeal nature. And a result, man has embodied God's substance. Just as a ray comes from the sun, light shines from a lamp, and the figure of a man points to his humanity, so if the Father's glory truly appeared to us and if his flesh is the stamp of his substance, it follows that the Father's nature is fleshly. For the corporeal cannot [M.1161] express the incorporeal, and the visible cannot radiate the invisible; rather, the [divine] glory, splendor, form and substance reveals the invisible [God]. If it has a bodily form, it certainly could not be incorporeal. But the common synod of the Fathers held at Nikaea confessed the doctrine of like substance. No one can say that a similar substance can apply to a different one; rather, one and the same substance is consubstantial to whatever belongs to it. If the Son of God is fleshly, his nature is composed of flesh existing before the ages. [Apollinarius] does not doubt the [Son's] consubstantiality [J.158] with the Father; however, anything consubstantial is composed of the same substance, so he suggests that the Father's nature is human and corporeal which both [Persons] share. As a result, we have two absurd conclusions: either the Father is incorporeal and the Son's divinity is fleshly and composed of a different substance, or if both Father and Son have the same substance and divinity, the Father's divine nature consists of flesh. But Zachariah [cf. J.154] corrects this inaccuracy by saying that the Son is the same as the Father, that is, he is connatural with him and of the same substance. If this teaching is incorrect and not a mere opinion, [Apollinariou] presents us with something further: "The prophetic word clearly says that the [Son] does not share the same substance as God according to the flesh; rather, he is united to the flesh according to the spirit." How can a carnal God be united to flesh before the creation of the world and the ages? The flesh is last in the order of creation. If the divinity was united to the flesh, has not human nature come into existence? But [Apollinarius] knows a flesh other than man's. How, he says, can that man [Christ] who spoke to us of the Father be the same God who created the ages? Who can explain for us the awkwardness of these novel mysteries? Along with other inaccurate doctrines, [Apollinarius] taught that a man existed before man and [M.1164] that the flesh of his creation preceded the ages which was made at the fullness of time.

But let the composer of this tract deceive himself by his own ridiculous teachings. As for ourselves, we recall the apostolic [J.159] teaching as a means to reproach his sacrilegious opinions. For example, "He who was in the form of God" [Phil 2.6]. Here it does not say that [Christ] had the same form as God; rather, he existed in the form of God. All things belonging to Father are in the Son. The Son fully has in his form the Father's figure, eternity, quantity, immateriality and incorporeality. In addition, he is equal with God. What sort of equality can be maintained with regard to discrepancy or distinction [as pertaining to Father and Son]? How can an equality of different natures be reconciled? If we have a corporeal nature on one hand and an incorporeal nature on the other, how can this difference exist [in one person]? "He emptied himself, taking the form of a slave" [Phil 2.7]. What form of a slave? [Paul] refers to the body. We have received only what the Fathers have handed down to us. Indeed, he who said that [Christ] had the corporeal form of a slave claims that despite his divine form, he has assumed one of a slave. But the words "he emptied himself" clearly show that the appearance revealed to us did not exist from all eternity; rather, he is equal to God in the fullness of divinity, is unapproachable, inaccessible and incomprehensible by our limited human thought. Once death had circumscribed [Christ] in his bodily nature, he emptied himself, as the Apostle says, of his ineffable divine glory and humbled himself to assume our limitations. Although he was great, perfect and incomprehensible, he assumed our human nature. "He was made in the likeness and form of man" [Phil 2.7]. His nature did not have this likeness from the beginning nor was he fashioned in a corporeal manner. For how could a corporeal form make an impression on [J.160] this [divine] form? Nevertheless, [Christ] was made into an [corporeal] form because he assumed the nature of a body.

"He was found as a man." Yes, a man not in everything but as one in harmony with the mystery of his virgin birth. Thus [Christ] manifested himself not because he was subservient to the laws of human nature; rather, he shared our life as God and [M.1165] did not lack a proper human constitution through marriage. He was found not as an inferior man by a defect in his constitution but as man. Thus [Christ] humbled himself and became man without having been altered. If he was [divine] from the beginning, what did his humiliation consist of? Now the Most High humbled himself by a union with our humble nature. When he united himself to the form of a slave and become one with it, he shared the sufferings proper to this condition. Our bodily members are connected to each other as though by nails; as a result, the body suffers as a whole when it is affected. Thus the unity of our human nature appropriates passions as our own. As Isaiah says, "He bore our infirmities and carried our sorrows" [Is 53.4] and sustained abuse that he may heal us by his affliction. The divinity did not suffer; rather, the man united to the divinity endured these blows. As a result, evil lost its grip over us. Since death entered the world through man's disobedience, the obedience of the second man had driven it out [Rom 5.19]. [J.161] Therefore [Christ] was obedient unto death which healed the disobedience resulting from our sins, for he destroyed death, the result of our disobedience, by his resurrection from the dead.

Destruction of death is man's resurrection. Because of this, [Paul] says, "God has highly exalted him" [Phil 2.9]. This sentence acts like a seal to our earlier remarks. The Most High clearly has not need of exultation; however, the humility [of human nature] raised on high acquired a sublimity which it did not originally have. Human nature united with the Lord becomes one with the divinity whose loftiness exalts it from its humble state. Christ the Lord experienced the humble form of a slave and was exulted. Since Christ was called a man with respect to his humanity, Gabriel announced his humanity to the Virgin [Lk 1.31]. Even though the divine nature cannot be named, one person exists from a union of two natures: God receives a name from his humanity. "The name of Jesus every knee shall bend" [Phil 2.10]. The divinity [M.1168] which is nameless belongs to the man who is above every name in order that just as the lofty [divine nature] is present within humility, so does humility assume lofty characteristics. For just as the divinity is named through humanity, so he who transcends every name is united to the divinity by reason of his humble condition. Just as the lowly status of a slave's form is united to God, so adoration of the divinity attributed to God [J.162] strives for union with the divinity. Thus "at the name of Jesus Christ every knee shall bend in the heaven, on the earth and under the earth, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father. Amen" [Phil 2.10].

But it seems that [Apollinarius] is ashamed of himself, and his inappropriate words attempt to subvert the Son's earthly resemblance to men: "Behold, Jesus Christ preexisted in his equality with the Father and became like men." Here he seems to repent of his words. Would that this were true, and that he renounce such an erroneous opinion, for we would then dismiss our disapproval directed against him! But it seems that [Apollinarius] stumbles into another impropriety by uttering prudent remarks: "What can be clearer? Opposites cannot be united, that is, the perfect God with perfect man." This statement clearly is not related with the preceding one, a fact which will become clear to anyone who follows the author's intent. How can [Apollinariou] demonstrate that [Christ] who was not perfect man through whom the perfect God became incarnate, had preexisted as equal with the Father and in the likeness of man? When considering the distance between heaven and earth, we can clearly say that lead is heavier than tin. This difference in weight represents the distance between heaven and earth. And so the imperfect [J.163] humanity shared by God fails to demonstrate that the Son's likeness condescended to assume the earthly nature of men. But I will overlook the impiety and folly of this opinion. By closely following [Apollinarius'] words, I will attempt to refute him wherever possible. He claims that God is not perfect with the perfect man [Christ]. Since he called both natures imperfect, he expressed ambiguity [M.1169] about them. From what we have heard it is impossible to grasp this imperfection whether it pertains to God, man or both together. [Apollinarius] says that God has the glory of God by the Spirit while man bears an inglorious human form in the body. He speaks of God and then of man. It is clear to everyone that the meaning of these two terms differ, for they explain what pertains to God and humanity respectively. For God always remains the source of goodness; he had always existed in the past and will continue to do so in the future. On the other hand, man shares the nature of irrational animals yet is not dominated as they are by their bodies and sense perceptions. Mind, which is man's proper nature, distinguishes him from irrational beasts. No one can define man as composed of a body, bones and senses nor judge human nature as simply the capacity to eat or be subject to change; rather, man is endowed with thought and reason. Thus we are compelled to attribute a nature [J.164] by an appropriate name. When speaking of man, Apollinarius means that he is rational; if this term contains what belongs to the divinity, then the interpretation of what he means by man is not valid. But when speaking of man, [Apollinarius] indeed utters the truth. But the truth of this name demonstrates man as a rational animal, the intention he wishes to convey. Man is necessarily rational and is not a man should he lacks this capacity.

[Apollinarius] says, "But man's body is a vile form." Although such words do not come from scripture, we should examine them and refute his mistaken remarks. He says that man's body is a vile form. Therefore, the glory of a man or true glory is life according to virtue. Effeminate attributes may be defined by good complexion and corporeal beauty whereas the body's ugliness reveals unbecoming actions. If [M.1172] we confess the glory of men as virtue, then evil is disgraceful. However, Apollinarius claims that God assumed the disgraceful form of a human being. So if disgrace belongs to evil, free will is likewise disgraceful; however, thought is a movement of the mind, so when [Apollinarius] considers the human ignominy assumed by God, he does not divorce man from his rational capacity which God acknowledges by human life. The divine scriptures [J.165] concur with the fact that [Christ] became sin for us [2Cor 5.21] and united man's sinful soul to himself. "The Lord appeared in the form of a slave" [Phil 2.7]. Was this form which the Lord had assumed noble or not? Someone may claim that which was inferior and circumscribed by life's necessities is not honorable. [Apollinarius] says, "Not a man but as a man because the noble part is dissimilar to man." If he does not mean consubstantial, a different substance is implied. The reason for this different substance rests upon the fact that neither a common nature nor name can refer to [Christ's humanity and divinity]. The substance of fire and water are different and are named accordingly, but Peter and Paul are one nature and share a common name because their mutual substance makes both men. If any substance belongs to [Christ] and not to man but refers to appearances according to man, it is truly a different nature. [Apollinarius] says that everything pertaining to [Christ's humanity] is an appearance and deceptive fantasy; his nourishment and sleep lacked reality, all the miracles of healing were insubstantial, the crucifixion did not occur, he was not laid in the tomb and his resurrection from suffering did not transpire. But it seems that all these events were appearances and that scripture's testimony was void. If there was no man, how could [scripture] present us with a record about [Christ]? How could [Apollinarius] say that [Christ], though human, was alien to human substance? He did not say that he was consubstantial with man's proper nature. By separating this essential aspect of man, that is mind, he defines the rest of man as a beast, a fact which certainly is not true. Then [Apollinarius] continues, "He humiliated himself according to the flesh, yet God exalted him according to the divine sublimity." Here we have an even more sacrilegious statement than before. [Apollinarius] says that which was humbled differs from that which was exalted; [Christ's] flesh was brought low while his own [divine] nature [J.166] was not subject to such a humiliation. However, he believes that his divinity was exalted while his exalted state lacked nothing. How can the divinity be exalted since it transcends all creation and surpasses all sublimity? Rather, it is [Christ's] humble nature which is exalted, a fact which our author does not acknowledge as he had stated earlier.

[M.1173] [Apollinarius] continues to utter inane statements much like a person in his sleep. As a result, he usurps our words and combines with his own teaching good points which come from ours. For that which he discerns as glorified he deems worthy of honor. "He is glorified as man, but the glory which he possessed before the world was established belongs to God who has eternal existence." So far so good. However, if [Apollinarius] maintains this position, his assumptions may unfortunately be taken as conforming to orthodox doctrine. Here he resembles a person who embraces a sane teaching, but upon turning a bend in the road he is once again on the path of error. [Apollinarius] directs many abuses against us besides equating our [faith] to that of the Jews and Greeks. He does this by bringing up previously disgorged vomit; in other words, the vain presumption of his words has devised that Christ's flesh preexisted. He claims that the Son, whose mind was enfleshed, was born of a woman and did not receive his flesh from a virgin; instead, [Christ], who existed before the ages, merely passed through it. God then showed himself as carnal, for as [Apollinarius] himself had said, the [divine] mind assumed flesh.

[Apollinarius] says that the Lord of glory was crucified and that the prophets call him Lord of hosts. He next authenticates his words by employing such verses as "I say to you" [Lk 7.14], "I bid you" [Mk 9.25], "I am working" [Jn 5.17], and other more [J.167] sublime examples. Who is this noble person? How does [Apollinarius] deal with the breast, the swaddling clothes, life which grows and decays, the body's progressive growth, sleep, labor, parental obedience, trouble, grief, desire to eat the Passover supper, request for water, desire for food, chains, blows on the face, stripes from scourging, thorns on the head, the scarlet cloak, violence by [striking with] the reed, bitter wrath, vinegar, nails, spear, the fine garment, burial, tomb and the stone? How can such attributes belong to God? If God became incarnate and appeared through Mary, that is, he who had always existed and manifested his divinity, the divinity suffered such consequences: he sucked milk, was wrapped in swaddling clothes, took food, became weary, grew, reached maturity, suffered want, slept, grieved, was troubled, was afflicted, tasted food and [M.1176] drink, ran to the fig tree [Mk 11.13], failed to notice the fruit of its leaves and its ripeness, did not know the day and hour, was smitten, bound with chains, was flogged, nailed [to the cross], shed blood, died, was prepared for burial and was placed in a new tomb. While [Apollinarius] attributes all these experiences as connatural to the preexistent divinity, does he not say that [Christ] was nursed unless he sucked milk, did not fully partake of life unless he recovered strength and was fortified with food? How can the God who assumed flesh be ignorant of that day and hour [Mt 24.36]? How can he be ignorant of the season for figs because the Passover says that the fruit is not [J.168] found in the tree for eating? Tell me, who is ignorant? Who is afflicted by sadness? Who is constricted by weakness? Who cried out and was forsaken by God if the Father and Son are one God? And who experienced abandonment when crying out on the cross?

If the divinity suffered, rightly do reverent persons believe that the Son shares the one divinity belonging to the Father. This is the same suffering person who says, "My God, my God, why have your forsaken me" [Mt 27.46]? How can the one divine substance be divided in suffering, that is, one part undergoing the act of forsaking while another is forsaken? One suffers death while the other has life; one is killed and the other is immune to killing. Neither view ascribes to one divinity common to Father; hence, some persons take the side of Arius, or others oppose Arius by saying that [Father and Son] have one [divinity] and therefore do not consent to a mere fabrication. However, [Arius] ascribes passions and cries as coming from the humble condition of humanity; although the divine nature is immutable and free from passion, it consents to share in human suffering. [Apollinarius] himself testifies to this by saying, "As man he is glorified, rising up from ignominy; as God he possesses glory which existed before the world." For ignominy indeed belongs to our corporeal condition which is subject to passion, whereas eternal glory is immortal and free from passion.

In order not to falsely accuse [Apollinarius] I refer to his words in the same spirit which we have earlier examined them: "The Greeks and Jews are clearly faithless by failing to accept that God was born from a woman." Why is he now [J.169] silent with regard to the flesh when referring to [Christ's] birth? Indeed, that which was born from the flesh is flesh [M.1177] as the Lord says [Jn 3.6]. Since [Apollinarius] wishes the flesh born from a woman to be divine and intends to add that God did not appear in the flesh he says, "But God had flesh before the ages and was later born of a woman, underwent passions and by necessity had human nature." Although he says this, [Apollinarius] does not refer to [Christ's] humanity; rather, as man he was subject to passion while not partaking of human nature. How could he be man while lacking an earthly origin? Scripture says that the human race sprung from Adam and the first man came from earth by God's power [Gen 2.7]. Luke claimed that [Christ] was reputed to be Joseph's son and cites his genealogy, "he was from Adam" [Lk 3.38], a statement claiming that [Christ] is the origin of all our fathers. Hence, if [Christ] does not spring from the human race, he is not man but something other than a man. Since neither the man [Christ] did not share our human nature nor did the incorporeal God assume flesh, let [Apollinarius'] disciples and followers of his error now state their position with regard to God's incarnation: "But the Greeks and Jews will assent to our opinion if we say that a divinized man was born of a woman as in the case of Elias." And who among the Greeks will admit to the truth of Elias' miracles [2Kg 2.11]? Fire manifested itself in two forms: chariot and horses descended from heaven, a movement contrary to their nature. Elias was lifted up into the flaming chariot and saved from being burned by this fire while he was assumed along with the horses and chariot. If anyone accepts this as he should, he will [J.170] imply a figure of the mystery, that is, a prophecy of the Lord's incarnation prefigured in this narrative. As fire tends upwards and the divine power downward, Elias, who was infused by heavenly fire, partakes of its natural movement and is raised up on high. Thus the immaterial and incorporeal essence, the power of the Most High, assumed a servant's form through the Virgin and raised it up to his own sublimity, having transformed it into a divine, immortal form. Anyone finding this difficult to accept could not believe in Elias' miracles, and the person who had earlier learned that the truth had overshadowed [Elias] would stubbornly refuse to accept this truth.

[Apollinarius] now rails abusive words against us which we should reject and concocts the following myth [M.1180]: "Those who do not ascribe to the form of faith, namely, the birth of God from a woman and his crucifixion by the Jews, are likewise ashamed by such things." Who does not know that the invectives directed against his adversaries are ineffective? There are two pits, one for Apollinarius and the other for Arius. Both are equally ruinous, but Arius seems to be the lesser of the two evils. Both men denigrate the uncompounded nature of the Only-Begotten [Son] by saying that he has a humble condition; however, Arius attributes the angels' incorporeal nature to the Lord [J.171]. He likewise professes that the [divine] uncreated nature is inferior and resembles created beings. This absurd position maintains that [Christ] is merely a man, has the same nature as the angels and his nature is corporeal. Arius says that the incorporeal nature surpasses corporeal bodies, an impiety less absurd than Apollinarius' position. What person who explains the mystery [of Christ's birth] from the Virgin is unfaithful to the form of our faith? Would that [Apollinarius] make public his derisive attitude towards our faith and offer his opinion! For our part, we say that the God whose essence is immaterial, invisible, and incorporeal, disposed himself to assume flesh out of love for mankind at the consummation of the world when evil had reached its peak. He united himself to human nature in order to destroy sin just as if the sun had dwelt in a gloomy cave and then banished darkness by its light. [Christ] assumed our uncleanliness yet was not defiled; rather, he purified this filth in his own person. "For the light shined in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it" [Jn 1.5]. Here we have an example of the art of healing. Once an annoying illness has been cured, it is banished and is not transformed into the art of healing. Such is our position. But [Apollinarius] says, "God was incarnate from the beginning. He had a visible, palpable body which was born of a woman at the last days. He grew progressively by taking food yet existed before everything [J.172] and created men along with both visible and invisible reality. He experienced fatigue and felt distress in the face of death." I do not know how a wise person, when contemplating the heavens, earth, and all creation's marvels, can maintain that his Creator experienced no labor [M.1181], yet say that he engaged in labor as, for example, his journey from Juda to Galilee [Jn 4.6]. The same person who asked the Samaritan woman for a drink turned the rock into a pool of water for the Israelites. For forty years [Ex 16.35] he did not weary to provide heavenly nourishment for such a multitude; he ran to the fig tree hoping to eat its fruit yet found none [Mt 21.19]. Let the prudent hearer judge from these examples which position belongs to the form of faith or does not.

"But," says [Apollinarius], "he who was crucified was not divine by nature nor did he have any share in it even though he is spirit." Such a false accusation becomes an apology which is an outright denial. If Apollinarius believes that the mind is spirit, he claims that one half Christian's [human constitution] cannot be united with God; rather, the whole man must be united to the divine power. Therefore, he wishes to attribute names to various aspects of man, such as mind, spirit or heart. Scripture says that three parts form man's governing part: "A pure heart create in me, God" [Ps 51.12], "The man of understanding will acquire skill" [Prov 1.5], and "No one knows a man's thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him" [2Cor 2